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Promoting the development and dissemination of economic and
political information has clearly become a common legal solution to a
variety of public policy problems and market breakdowns. Applying
the perspective of two important legal approaches, law and economics
and civic virtue, 1 many scholars have demonstrated the theoretical
and practical values of increased information in enhancing both public
and private decisionmaking. 2
The approach of law and economics can be traced back to early
scholarship on private commercial and corporate markets. This literature envisioned a state of "perfect information" and zero transaction
1. I use the term civic virtue, though this school can also be identified more generally as civic
republicanism.
2. See infra notes 20-66 and accompanying text.
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costs as the ideal environment for facilitating "pareto-superior" exchanges and moving toward the economic ideal, "pareto optimality."3
In order to improve imperfect markets, therefore, the early law-andeconomics literature often suggested that the government should step
in, through either the adoption of legal rules requiring disclosure of
information by private parties, the direct production of information by
public sources, the creation of property rights in information, or some
combination thereof. 4 Similarly, in response to analogous concerns in
the governmental sphere, law-and-economics scholars (especially
many who are writing in the public choice tradition) 5 have found that
the public has a disincentive to gather political information due to serious free-rider problems. 6 The solution offered recently by some of
these scholars, like many of their private law predecessors, has been to
adopt a variety of legal doctrines that either increase the availability of
information to the general public or improve the ability of private individuals and diffuse groups to collect such information. 7
From a quite different perspective (though in some respects pursuing oddly parallel goals), recent writings in the civic virtue tradition
have applauded attempts to stimulate rational dialogue by expanding
the amount of information available to the public and to actors in
3. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. EcoN. 1, 8 (1960) (noting that with zero
transaction costs, efficient distribution of resources is achievable regardless of how courts set the
initial entitlement). Unfortunately, because information ordinarily has many of the qualities of a
public good (namely, it is freely available to the public without possibility of exclusion of free
riders and without increasing costs to producers) the private market frequently fails to stimulate
adequate levels of information. See Grossman & Stiglitz, On the Impossibility ofInformationally
Efficient Markets, 70 AM. EcoN. REV. 393 (1980).
4. As a consequence, the private free-riding tendency not to produce information could be
minimized. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
The assumption that economic agents prefer to have better information if they can acquire it
without cost is implicit in models determining efficient information structures and even in
models of optimal search: In these models, the costs of information acquisition and transmission and the costs of search are the only factors that limit the quest for more
information.
L. PHILLIPS, THE EcONOMJCS OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION 12 (1988).
5. Public choice is "the application of economic [models] to political decisionmaking." Fox,
The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision Making: Antitrust as a Window, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 560 n.17 (1986).
6. Moreover, this incentive supposedly affects groups differently: the rise of so-called special
interest groups in a variety of legislative and administrative contexts is said to be largely the
result of asymmetry in information acquisition between more diffuse groups and more concentrated groups. Narrowly focused, more concentrated groups, according to this analysis, have an
information/transaction-cost advantage in pursuing their political interests because they suffer
from fewer and less-pronounced collective action problems. See infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
'
7. Toward this end, legal and other mechanisms would be adopted that ease disclosure of
information into the public domain. Such mechanisms include strict enforcement of the first
amendment, expansive disclosure requirements, and "liberal" techniques of statutory construction and judicial review. See infra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
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Congress and administrative agencies. This literature envisions deliberation on ethical norms as being enhanced by the ability of diverse
groups to present their views in the political sphere, 8 thereby increasing the variety of perspectives. 9
Despite these persuasive arguments, there are times when we
might well prefer to be less informed. For example, many people
would prefer not to know a major piece of personal information, the
specific date of their own death. 10 This article explores the ramifications of this powerful insight in the arena of public decisionmaking by
detailing the advantages which can flow from the structure of some
political institutions that limit political information.
In developing this argument, I will rely principally on the literature on political parties and party identification, suggesting that both
the value and viability of parties depend on their ability to limit certain
types of information and to channel information to centralized political institutions. In this sense, the present analysis is a sequel to a
prior article, in which I relied on the literature on political parties to
highlight some of the benefits of political centralization and the potential costs of certain decentralizing reforms advanced in the civic virtue
literature. 11 Here, I argue that if one focuses on questions of mass
8. In particular, checks and balances, decentralized units of decisionmaking, and proportional representation have been offered as beneficial techniques for "proliferating points of access" to governmental deliberations, expanding the number and types of groups that are able to
introduce their particular perspective into the public debate. See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
9. Of course, in comparison to the classic law-and-economics perspective, civic virtue advocates emphasize the value of information in terms of improving the ethical decisionmaking of
public and private decisionmakers. As set forth below, rational dialogue is supposed to "make us
think from the point of view of everyone" by elucidating differing viewpoints, perspectives, and
backgrounds, forcing us to appreciate our differences and to feel empathy and respect for those
who do not share our background and viewpoint. Under this framework, information is not
simply a utilitarian exchange of price or similar information about goods and services; it encompasses the examination from different perspectives of the normative value of different life styles.
From this intellectual free exchange and dialogue, which tracks many traditional liberal defenses
of the first amendment, an agreement on social ends and an appreciation of private autonomy is
supposed to be furthered. Thus, while law-and-economics scholars emphasize the value of information in improving the instrumental ability of private actors to achieve or further their own
preexisting goals, civic virtue scholars see the exchange of viewpoints as helping to shape those
very goals.
10. See, e.g., Fitts & Fitts, Ethical Standards of the Medical Profession, 297 ANNALS 17, 25
(1955). In a quite different area, the law of evidence, courts routinely exclude information from
admission on the grounds that its prejudicial effect "substantially outweighs" its probative value.
See FED. R. Evm. 403. Needless to say, the list of information society might prefer individuals
not to know is extensive. See, e.g., c. BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 21
(1989) (summarizing numerous examples).
11. See Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the
Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 (1988) [hereinafter Fitts, Vices of Virtue]; see also
Fitts, Look Before You Leap: Some Cautionary Notes on Civic Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1651
(1988). While the political party approach has not been explored by civic virtue and law-andeconomics scholars, political parties appear to enjoy the strong support of "a large majority of
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political organization and group dialogue, channeling information to
central political institutions, rather than simply permitting its diffusion
among the public, can be seen as a valuable tool in several different
ways. In particular, limiting information can sometimes narrow and
rationalize political choice, promote greater popular accountability
(especially among the poor), stimulate group dialogue, and forge political agreements. 12 Based on these observations, I will sketch four separate explanations (what I will crudely call models) of how less
information can be beneficial.
The first model suggests that more limited information can improve the rationality of decisionmaking itself. In recent years, social
psychologists have begun to examine the complex process through
which decisionmakers evaluate new information and make decisions
about appropriate action. This still-evolving and somewhat controversial literature suggests that the use of certain simplifying devices,
heuristic shortcuts which in effect exclude information and narrow
choices, can improve decisionmaking. 13 As outlined below, party
identification, and party influence more generally, have served this role
for the public, especially the poor, by ignoring certain types of political
information and emphasizing others.
The second model suggests that less information sometimes can
further traditional utilitarian goals by helping to overcome various
collective action problems. As numerous economists and political
scientists have noted, many coirective action problems (in other words,
many problems of group government organizations) stem from situations in which individuals' or groups' pursuit of their narrow self-inmainstream political scientists" concerned with government organization, see L. SABATO, THE
PARTY'S JUST BEGUN: SHAPING PoLmCAL PARTIES FOR AMERICA'S FUTURE 2 (1988), and
offer an important contrast to the usual law-and-economics and civic virtue perspectives. As a
strong advocate of political parties, E.E. Schattschneider, once wrote, "modem democracy is
unthinkable save in terms of the parties. As a matter of fact, the condition of the parties is the
best possible evidence of the nature of any regime." E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 1 (1942). While political parties probably enjoyed their greatest academic support in the
1940s and 1950s, there has been renewed scholarly interest of late, in part for the reasons suggested in this article.
12. It should be noted that group dialogue in the political context often occurs in fundamentally different ways from dialogue in the adjudicatory context.
As developed below, part of the argument is based on the potential advantages of more centralized information systems. In this sense, limiting information means limiting (or failing to
subsidize) information in one context as compared to another. At the same time, I also suggest
that along certain dimensions dispersed information may have negative effects on an absolute
level, regardless of whether resources used to develop information are transferred to a more
centralized information structure.
13. Analogous observations have been made in social science theory, philosophy, literary
theory, and private law literature. See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
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terest makes most or all parties worse off. 14 Government dominated
by special interest groups is thought to create an important example of
this difficulty. Although the traditional law-and-economics solution is
to expand the ability of diffuse groups to acquire information, these
problems also can be reduced by decreasing the ability of narrower
interest groups and individual politicians to develop information independently.15 Social and political structures that downplay certain information, especially strong political parties and party identification,
have often helped overcome the influence of narrower constituencies
iii this way.
The third model suggests that less information can make it easier
to reach political agreements and to overcome stalemates because actors with less information may avoid politically contentious issues.
While confronting problems normally improves the political process,
in some contexts less information can serve to remove intractable controversies from the political agenda. 16 For example, many budget
problems and political party divisions appear to have resulted from
our inability at times to prioritize among issues and to balance confrontation with avoidance in this way.
Finally, as a normative, ethical matter, vagueness about a group's
14. See generally R. HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982); M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OP COL·
LECTIVE ACTION (1965).
15. The problem and solution can thus be conceptualized as a prisoners' dilemma, the classic
game-theory predicament in which two cohorts in crime are individually offered a reduced sentence if they squeal on their compatriot. Although they will both be better off if they both
stonewall their interrogators, the private incentive is to squeal, disadvantaging both. While the
usual method for avoiding this perverse incentive is to reach a prior agreement not to accept the
interrogator's offer (thereby allowing private and group incentives to converge), the alternative
social-intervention technique hypothesized here is not to allow the interrogator's offer to be communicated in the first place, that is, to keep both the prisoners ignorant of what appears to be
their immediate self-interest, thereby furthering their joint long-term interests. In this way, ignorance would promote both efficiency and cooperative goals. Needless to say, this approach
would be valuable primarily where high transaction costs and strategic behavior preclude the
parties reaching a prior enforceable agreement, the normal law-and-economics/public choice solution to this problem.
An analogous issue can arise in the antitrust context, where market actors likely to enter into
a price-fixing conspiracy are restricted in communicating information about certain market activity. See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921). See generally R. HARDIN, supra note 14, at 131.
16. Examining such problems can cause political divisions that, in retrospect, almost everyone would agree should have been avoided. As an example of this view, Rawls has suggested
that the willingness to accept certain issues as beyond public purview is a precondition to the
stability of many liberal states. See Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14
PHIL. & Pua. AFF. 223, 251 (1985). Information limitations can serve an analogous function by
downplaying certain issues. Cf. P. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY 58
(1986) (increases in number of participants increases the probability of a voting cycle). To some
degree, this may be viewed as a philosophical or ideological prisoners' dilemma, and thus, a
variant of the second model. In this case, however, the prisoners' dilemma is ordinarily viewed
as overcoming ideological stalemate, rather than avoiding the inefficiency of interest group
government.

April 1990]

Veils of Ignorance

923

or an individual's place within the political system can serve to create
a real-world veil of ignorance - a state of imperfect information about
our own or other groups' place in society that can reduce self-interest
in social decisionmaking processes. In this way, vagueness about the
political position of different groups can promote public acceptance of
and desire for resource distribution, help stimulate a rational dialogue,
and even further a political consensus. 17 Indeed, the existence of a
greater historical consensus on separation-of-powers issues at various
points in our history, I suggest below, can be understood in terms of
this analysis and the viability of a strong two-party system. 18 Conversely, the recent proliferation of separation-of-powers confrontations
can be seen as partly resulting from the breakdown of this process and
from the effect of doctrinal changes supported in some of the civic
virtue and law-and-economics literatures.
My purpose in explicating these circumstances is not to suggest
that less information is presumptively a good thing. Except for the
resource cost of acquiring the information, dialogue and exchange of
information 'ordinarily improve deliberative as well as utilitarian
processes. 19 There are clear advantages to open discussion, and dangers in information limitation, such as political tyranny, that need not
be elaborated here. Needless to say, my goal is not to challenge widely
held beliefs about the first amendment or the value of free intellectual
exchange in our society.
Rather, I have two objectives. First, based largely (but not exclusively) on the political party literature, I propose to develop these four
models, or ideal types, demonstrating how the organization of political
institutions can be beneficial (in terms of social goals with which many
would agree) by downplaying various types of public information. I~
this sense, my purpose is academic: to explicate and understand several analyses of various types of information that are different from the
17. Significantly, this limitation on information improves decisionmaking in a different way
than civic virtue theory envisions. Civic virtue writers conceive of the decisionmaking capabilities of political actors as being improved by discussion - even confrontation - with opposing
viewpoints and perspectives. In other words, our ability to undertake ethical deliberation is improved by increasing our world of informati9n. To this extent, civic virtue seems to view political actors as more inherently virtuous and empathetic - a resource that can be tapped and
motivated through discussion with other participants. In the circumstances noted here, however,
it may be that our capacities for deliberation over social ends are improved by limiting our informational world - by veiling the real world applications of our decisions. See infra notes 173-77
and accompanying text,
18. See infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text,
19. Nothing said here denies that the insights of civic virtue and law and economics offer
powerful critiques of legal institutions and useful avenues for reform, Indeed, as suggested below, many of my observations are quite compatible with classical economic theory as it would
likely be applied to the analysis of party-based political structures.
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normal law-and-economics or civic virtue insights about public institutions. Although the United States has never had strong parties as
compared to countries such as Great Britain, historically its parties
have performed these functions to some extent and perhaps would
have to a greater degree had they been stronger or structured differently. Thus, quite apart from the factual issue of how significant these
effects are in a particular context, they represent alternative approaches that need to be weighed in policy analysis.
My second objective is more practical: to use these analyses to
understand and, in part, defend several government reforms that diverge from some current legal trends. These reforms are limited departures from the usual civic virtue and law-and-economics
approaches and from the general presumption in favor of information
proliferation. They include changed rules on campaign contributions
to individual politicians; reduced access to administrative agencies and
Congress; and centralization devices such as party identification and
party conventions. These changes would reduce support for dispersed
sources of information while, in other cases, strengthening the comparative informational advantages and accountability of certain central institutions. Although giving institutions or individuals the power
to decide how information should be shaped can create serious dangers, the way political institutions are organized can channel information to the advantage of the society as a whole.
Organizationally, the discussion will proceed as follows. In Parts I
and II, I shall summarize the law-and-economics and civic virtue perspectives on the value of political information and their proposals for
reforms in the political process that would stimulate greater political
information. These two literatures are often viewed as distinct in their
objectives: one seeking to improve means/ends rationality; the other
seeking to improve goal formation - a function that I loosely describe
as normative, ethical, or value-based. Nevertheless, they share some
common practical approaches where information is concerned. In
Part Ill, I shall discuss the instrumental advantages to limiting political information, focusing particularly on the role of political party
identification and party organization generally in promoting rational
decisionmaking (section III.A), overcoming the perverse influence of
special interest groups (section 111.B), and surmounting political stalemate (section 111.C). These sections cover, respectively, models one,
two, and three described above. Finally, in Part IV I shall explore th~
normative value of more limited information, based partly on the approach of Rawls' veil of ignorance (model four). This Part explores
such issues as delegation of legislative authority, separation-of-powers
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confrontations, and pluralist versus constitutional decisionmaking, all
in the context of the breakdown of political parties.
Clearly, each model focuses on a different type of information information about the often confusing range of diverse political options; about constituent or pork-barrel projects; about potentially divisive and destructive political debates; and about the impact on
different groups of alternative social policies. In each case, however,
strong political parties can be seen as performing a positive role in
reducing such information. Moreover, while we probably cannot create strong parties, and indeed would not want to in certain contexts,
some current proposed changes in government structure, which I will
explore in each section, may be helpful in furthering the beneficial aspects of the strong party tradition.
I.

THE VALUE OF INFORMATION IN PUBLIC DECISIONMAKING
UNDER THE LAW-AND-ECONOMICS MODEL

A.

General Problems with Limited Information

Perhaps the most fundamental tenet of law and economics is the
autonomy of individual choice.20 Taking the individual's valuation of
personal utilities as a given, law-and-economics scholars generally
seek to fashion various social or legal decisions that will maximize social welfare, in either a Pareto-superior or a Kaldor-Hicks sense. 21
While the precise mental processes through which individuals arrive at
their market choices are seldom the focus oflaw-and-economics analysis, this literature does recognize that preferences, as well as the individual's ability to locate avenues for pursuing them, are dependent
upon the information available to the individual.
Unfortunately, because perfectly functioning markets assume perfect information, the law-and-economics scholars face a· significant
20. The discussion that follows, like the description in the succeeding section on civic virtue,
seeks to sketch broad outlines of a literature in which there are obviously many different strands,
some of which may be in tension with my general summary. For this reason, I claim only to be
establishing an "ideal type," which serves to capture many of the central insights and directions
of a literature and can be helpful in understanding and comparing the perspectives of different
approaches. See M. WEBER, EcONOMY AND SOCIETY 9 (1978) [hereinafter M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY]; M. WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 91-112 (E.
Shils & H. Finch eds. 1949) [hereinafter M. WEBER, METHODOLOGY].
21. See B. ACKERMAN, EcONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW xi-xiv (1975); A.M.
POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND EcONOMICS 7-10 (2d ed. 1989); R. POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 11-17 (3d ed. 1986). Of course, there is an extensive literature questioning whether or to what extent this is an appropriate basis for decisionmaking. See, e.g.,
Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 485 (1980); Kennedy, CostBenefit Analysis of Entitlement Programs: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REv. 387, 401-21 (1981);
Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REv. 592
(1985).
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problem in ensuring that markets produce information sufficient to
justify deference to individual choice. Information is often a public
good, that is to say, an item freely available to the public without possibility of exclusion. 22 Due to free-rider problems, such goods are
likely to be produced suboptimally, absent government intervention.
Since it is often difficult to exclude information in economic and political markets from free use by others, there is a disincentive to produce
it at appropriate levels.23
The early law-and-economics literature sought to grapple with this
problem primarily in the commercial law context, pointing out the
large efficiency loss due to imperfect information, and the resulting
creation of suboptimal markets in commercial transactions and corporate stock. As a remedy, several government interventions were proposed for stimulating the production and dissemination of
information, including having direct public production, requiring bargaining parties to disclose material conditions, proxy statements, labels, and warranties, and assigning property rights to the least cost
22. There are two additional problems, one technical and one philosophical, which are not
explored in depth in this article. First, as a technical matter, the individual knows whether the
information is valuable only after she expends the effort to acquire it. Logically, neither the
society nor the individual can make a prior utility calculation that the information should have
been secured, or, more broadly, make a judgment with respect to a class of decisions that a given
amount of information should have been acquired, or a specific system used to acquire it, without
first acquiring the information. Any judgment about proper resource allocations for information
must be imperfect, based on predictions on the value of the information for that or similarly
situated persons. Thus, inductive judgments about information acquisition are inherently imperfect. Only after obtaining the information - making the decision - can one know whether it
was justified. See generally H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS: INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON
CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1968).
Second, apart from these technical problems, there is a philosophical problem with information acquisition. To the extent that the acquisition of the information changes the nature of the
individual, it may be philosophically impossible, even understanding the "value" of the information, to know whether or not it should be acquired under an economic model. The answer
depends upon which individual - the one with or without the information - is making the
decision. If the individual's views on the value of the information change, it is logically impossible to determine whose autonomous preferences should be respected. See D. PARFIT, REASONS
AND PERSONS 219-43 (1984); Ainslie, Beyond Microeconomics: Conflict Among Interests in a
Multiple Self as a Determinant of Value, in THE MULTIPLE SELF 133 (J. Elster ed. 1986); Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 769, 779. For this reason, one's philosophy of
information acquisition is directly relevant to whatever structure is employed for government
organization.
These problems obviously may be more significant with respect to some issues than to others.
As one moves from micromanagement questions, such as consumer search strategies, to issues
concerning alternative states of political organization, both of these difficulties may be exacerbated. The more fundamental the question being researched, the more varied the potential states
of the world and the more likely the individual in that new state is to be different from the
decisionmaker in the existing world.
23. See Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Inventio11, in THE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (Na·
tional Bureau of Economic Research 1962); Arrow, Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis,
64 AM. EcON. REV. l (1974).
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avoider. 24
This perspective was later extended to the public sphere in order
better to understand the general problems of political organization and
the perverse advantages enjoyed by certain groups in influencing public policy. 25 As to the organizational problems, since politics and the
exercise of power are almost necessarily group activities, information
usually becomes important only to the degree that the group with
which one is associated is able to assimilate it and exercise influence.
As a result, the public good/collective action problem inherent in the
information market is compounded by the collective action problem of
group political organization: "[I]gnorance is rational because the
costs of obtaining a collective good are shared by many, and no one
individual's contribution ... is thus likely to make a difference." 26
According to this model, therefore, "one can expect individuals to be
24. See, e.g., 0. WILLIAMSON, THE EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985); 0.
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES (1975). An extensive literature has arisen regarding how various institutional frameworks can economize and facilitate greater exchanges of information. As a general matter, this literature reflects a careful balancing of the need to create
sufficient incentives for individuals to generate information against the problems created when
information, once created, is not available. Since the processes of bargaining to acquire information and of knowing initially how much information to bargain for are inherently imperfect, a
strict property limitation on information would be counterproductive.
25. As in the private sphere, information is advantageous in the public context because it
facilitates individuals' and groups' ability to identify their interests and to use governmental intervention to promote these interests.
Of course, some legal scholars view the public sphere, in contrast to the private market, as a
fundamentally redistributive enterprise, rather than as an efficiency-enhancing process. According to this rent-seeking model, information in the public sphere tends to be purely redistributional, with the benefits of action predicated merely on one's comparative ability to understand
and press one's interest in competition with one's opponents for the same resources. For descriptions, see Macey, Competing Economic Views of the Constitution, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 50
(1987). Macey claims:
[T]he same invisible hand that leads to wealth creation in private market transactions causes
massive economic inefficiencies and social instability when it is set loose in the political
sphere. . • . As a consequence of the government's ability to coerce, rationally self-interested
citizens have incentives to organize into special interest group coalitions in order to demand
regulation that makes them better off.
Id. at 57; see also Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 123, 133 (1989) ("For some, the only public purpose worthy of respect
seems to be the elimination of the public sector itself."); Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and
Economics -And the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341, 342 (1988) ("Scholars in all
three traditions [in law and economics] are skeptical about the legitimacy of legislative and bureaucratic processes and share a confidence in the value of market outcomes"). For examples,
see TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (J. Buchanan, R. Tollison & G. Tullock eds. 1980); Crain & Tollison, Constitutional Change in an Interest-Group Theory of Government, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1979); Crain & Tollison, The Executive Branch in the Interest
Group Perspective, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 555 (1979). In other words, because of the coercive powers
of the state, information is more likely to be a zero-sum game, a process of rent-seeking, with
negligible social value. But cf. Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value ofInformation and the
Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. EcoN. REV. 561 (1971) (discussing the redistributive and
efficiency consequences of information in private markets).
26. Oppenheimer, Public Choice and Three Ethical Properties of Politics, 45 PUB. CHOICE
241, 243 (1985).
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relatively uninformed about and unmotivated by the collective consequences of their political behavior."27
Beyond this general disincentive to service adequate levels of information, the differential access to information among competing groups
also presents problems in political organization. As a variety of scholars have detailed, discrete groups with a high degree of interest in specific outcomes often enjoy organizational advantages because
information is costly to obtain and because such groups enjoy lower
transaction costs. More diffuse groups, on the other hand, often have
free-rider problems in obtaining the information, even though as
groups they may care more about the particular outcome. 2s
According to the economic analysis, moreover, this differential access often disadvantages large segments of society, even though most,
if not all, citizens are part of at least one special interest group in one
political context or another. In the first place, the organizing advantages of special interest groups often outweigh the need to ·counteract
any majoritarian bias in our political system. According to the economic model, they serve to supply a greater advantage to narrow
groups than is justified by the weight of their interests. 29 More importantly, it is argued, because virtually all of us are part of both special
interest groups and diffuse groups in different contexts, many groups
27. Id. at 245; see also Macey, supra note 25, at 77:
As a general matter, citizens will have little incentive to inform themselves of the nature of
the various statutes passed in the ordinary course of a legislative session because the cost of
such legislation is lower than the cost of acquiring such information. And even if the costs
of acquiring information about a proposed statute are low relative to the effects of the statute, the costs of organizing an effective political coalition to oppose such a statute is sufficiently high that expending resources to discover the economic effects of ordinary laws
remains irrational for the ordinary citizen.
28. This important observation about the effect of group size on group activity was made
many years ago by Mancur Olson. M. OISON, supra note 14. This insight has since been expanded into a richer typology of possible incentives to group action. See, e.g., R. HARDIN, supra
note 14; M. HAYES, LoBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL MARKETS 64127 (1981); J. WIISON, PoLmCAL ORGANIZATIONS 327-45 (1973); Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE PoLmcs OF REGULATION 357, 357-72 (J. Wilson ed. 1980). For empirical
evidence, see, for example, J. FEREJOHN, PORK BARREL POLITICS: RIVERS AND HARBORS LEG·
ISLATION, 1947-1968 (1974); C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS (1977); G. McCONNELL,
PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN PEMOCRACY (1966). According to this analysis, the "tendency of our factional politics to redistribute wealth from large groups to small ones [may have]
produced the opposite of the oppressive majorities that the Framers feared." Bruff, Legislative
Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 207, 216 (1984); see also Ackerman,
Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713, 745-46 (1985); Posner, Economics, Politics,
and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 266 (1982).
29. In other words, the power of special interest groups does not further Kaldor-Hicks "efficiency" in government, but may do the exact opposite: it may bias the system beyond what the
"preferences" of the narrow group warrant. See Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971); Mashaw, supra note 25, at 127 ("analysts in the 'interest
group' tradition predict that governmental programs will be too large, directed at the wrong ends
and perversely redistributional"). See generally M. OISON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982).
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in our society are disadvantaged by this process. In effect, special interest government can often create a type of social prisoners' dilemma,
where most citizens are made worse off by pursuing their self-interest
as part of many successful special interest groups.30 In its extreme
form, members of Congress or other political actors enter into explicit
or implicit agreements to support a general system of legislation enacting different group projects, a process described as "universalism." 31
30. See generally M. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON EsrABLISHMENT (1977).- Technically, this is supposed to create a prisoners' dilemma deadweight loss,
whereby the majority of citizens end up paying for more public services than their demand would
justify, since they pay for their own interest groups' projects (and those of other groups) with
higher tax dollars. This system is supposedly inefficient in a Kaldor-Hicks sense because, at least
in a perfect world, most of us could be made better off by not initiating the distributive scheme
and retaining some previously spent tax dollars. Macey explains it this way:
Since most groups expect to be net losers from a pervasive system of special interest group
activities, these groups have a strong incentive to enact constitutional rules that raise the
cost of rent seeking generally - even if doing so means forgoing a certain measure of
favorable legislation later on. The costs of giving up this favorable legislation are outweighed by the benefits of being protected from the expense of paying for the wealth transfers that go to others.
Macey, supra note 25, at 73-74; see also Aranson, Gellhom & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative
Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982); Bruff, supra note 28, at 216 ("When groups compete
for legislation, each has an incentive to demand its private benefits, even though the net result of
the process is a welfare loss to all."); McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the
Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 118 (1987).
31. Of course, it is possible to argue, contrary to the textual thesis, that a system of political
universalism, where each interest group is more likely to be assured its piece of the political pie,
protects the lot of the worst off, and is thus defensible on redistributive grounds. Although
intellectually intriguing and undoubtedly true in particular cases, this argument appears factually
problematic in the United States today, at least according to the public choice perspective.
According to this analysis, universalism is supposed to promote equality by minimizing the
possibility that any one group is left out of the ruling political coalition - in other words, by
improving the position of what would be the worst-off group in a majority rule system. And
while protecting the group that would have been worst off may reduce 'the size of the overall pie,
in universalism all participants may be willing to buy into the agreement because they do not
know ex ante whether they will be in that group. See Miller, Pluralism and Social Choice, 77
AM. POL. Set. REV. 734, 737 (1983) ("In a pluralist society, crosscut by many cleavages and
partitioned into a multiplicity of preference clusters, political satisfaction is distributed much
more equally."); cf THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 62 (J. Madison) (P. Ford ed. 1898) (where there
is "a greater variety of parties and interests," it is "less probable that a majority of the whole will
have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens").
In this sense, universalism could be rationalized using a type of Rawlsian veil-of-ignorance
analysis, whereby everybody is willing to accept fewer social resources in order to improve the
position of the worst-off group (which might be them), and to ensure the continuation of the
political distributive system. See Rawls, supra note 16; Barry, Is Democracy Special?, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 155, 179 (P. Laslett & J. Fishkins eds. 1979); Weingast, A Rational Choice Perspective in Congressional Norms, 23 AM. J. POL. Set. 245 (1979). Since pursuit
of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is not necessarily consistent with Rawls' "difference principle," the
resulting system may violate norms of efficiency under public choice models, but comport with
some sense of political morality. The reason the system is politically acceptable is simply that no
group knows ex ante who will be the worst off.
Unfortunately, this argument succeeds only if one views universalism as protecting the worst
off in society, as distinguished from those who happen to lose in a particular political coalition
game. According to many observers, however, the losers in political majoritarian politics tend
not to be disproportionately the worst off in society, but rather simply interest groups who are
not part of the majority coalition. See R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 133
(1956); Ackerman, supra note 28, at 745-46; Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75
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For this reason, despite the benefits of special interest group influence,
such as facilitating greater pluralism and perhaps greater dialogue, the
public choice analysis suggests that our current political system has
probably tilted too far in their direction. 3 2
B.

The Influence of Special Interest Groups in Public Law

The greater ability of concentrated groups to secure information
has consequences in two different political and legal contexts, which
are related but sometimes have been treated separately in the literaMICH. L. REV. 1162, 1190-91 (1977). See generally Fitts, Vices of Virtue, supra note 11, at 157984. To the degree that many different groups tend to be winners and losers in different
majoritarian coalitions, there would likely be a social advantage by limiting the universalistic
cycle.
32. To be sure, it might be suggested that universalism (and interest group pluralism generally) is beneficial, despite its inefficiencies, because it furthers resource redistribution within a
progressive taxation system. Ultimately, however, this argument appears to falter on factual
grounds, at least according to the economic perspective.
To put the thesis in its clearest form: interest group pluralism supposedly creates an overpro·
duction of government resources by ensuring that the important actors on a particular issue are
disproportionately those who benefit - the special interest groups - while the diffuse groups
who pay the taxes are less organized. Assuming the tax system is both exempt from this interest
group process and is progressive, universalism would thereby serve to create a bias in favor of
redistribution. While a costless redistributive system would do more, within our current political
environment where we must generate the political will to redistribute, pluralism would facilitate
redistribution. Thus, some might argue, it is appropriate in certain instances to redistribute
through pluralism, recognizing there will be some deadweight loss, but a redistributive advan·
tage. Cf. Markovits, Duncan's Do Nots: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Determination of Legal
Entitlements, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1169, 1174-77 (1984) (positive distributive impacts may outweigh concerns for efficiency).
This defense of pluralism, it should be noted, differs from the traditional pluralist claim that
most interests would be represented within a pluralist community, ensuring that the pluralist
compromise would adequately reflect a legitimate accommodation among existing parties. See
infra note 93. As noted above, the political economy literature has demonstrated persuasively
the existence of pervasive collective action problems that undermine this analysis: some groups
are not part of, or are at a market disadvantage in, pluralist politics. See supra note 28 and
accompanying text. The above analysis suggests, rather, that, given a preexisting redistributive
tax structure, some differential distribution may exist, but is "ethically" beneficial. While the
relevant constituencies are included - those who wish distribution - there is a veil of ignorance
with respect to those groups who are likely to pay, or at least their costs have already been
established.
Unfortunately, while intriguing, the argument ultimately seems factually problematic. As
numerous scholars have observed, wealthier groups often have an organizational advantage in
pluralist politics; the poor are often the diffuse group that is kept out of the pluralist distributive
debate. See THE BIAS OF PLURALISM (W. Connolly ed. 1969); K. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY,
ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 87, 395-403 (1986). Moreover, the dis·
persion of political responsibility endemic to pluralist politics can confuse the public, especially
the poor and less educated. See Burnham, The Turnout Problem, in ELECTIONS AMERICAN
STYLE 97, 131-33 (A. Reichley ed. 1987). Finally, and most importantly, there is evidence that
the tax system, especially during times of so-called "normal" politics, when numerous tax loop·
holes are secured, is not exempt from this pluralist bias. See G. Cox, M. Mccubbins & B. Weingast, Congress and the Distributive Tendency in Tax Policy (unpublished manuscript on file with
author); McClure and Zodrow, Treasury I and the Tax Reform Act of 1986: The Economics and
Politics of Tax Reform, 1 EcoN. PERSP. 37, 37-38 (1987). A government which makes decisions
through a pluralist process in both tax and expenditure contexts cannot claim this nonnative
defense.
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ture. The first is electoral. Special interest groups, because they tend
to be more concentrated, are supposed to have disproportionate advantages in determining their interests on specific issues, securing the
information with respect to those interests, and notifying political representatives about their desires. 33 In effect, they enjoy reduced transaction costs in securing the information necessary to engage in
electoral political action. More diffuse groups experience serious collective action problems in. organizing institutions for the purpose of
securing and delivering information necessary to pursue their electoral
positions. 34
A second and related context in which special interest groups are
said to exercise disproportionate influence over government behavior
occurs in the formulation and implementation stages of government
decisions. 3 s In such cases, 36 government actors vested with supposedly final decisionmaking authority (such as Congress or the President) find that.their decisions or the implementation of their decisions
in administrative agencies can be perverted l?y special interest groups
that have a marJied advantage in affecting the execution of broad directives or mandates within the bureaucracy. 37
33. See K. SCHOLZMAN & J. TIERNEY, supra note 32.
34. Id.
35. See Bruff, supra note 28, at 244; B. OWEN & R. BRAEUTIGAM, THE REGULATION
GAME: STRATEGIC USE OF THE ADMINISfRATIVE PROCESS 1-13 (1978); CASE STUDIES IN
REGULATION: REVOLUTION AND REFORM 7-10 (L. Weiss & M. Klass eds. 1981). For the
classic view on interest group government, see T. Low1, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969) and
Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 295 (1987).
0

36. As a theo retical matter, some political science literature analyzes these latter situations as
agency-principal problems, in which the principal (the President or Congress) has difficulty ensuring that its subordinate - the administrative age.ncy - is fulfilling its mandate. See McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L.
EcoN. & ORG. 243, 247 (1987). According to this analysis, special interest groups often have a
marked advantage in perverting the "principal's" intent, especially in light of the difficulty in
monitoring the complex decisions emanating from the administrative bureaucracy, and increasing the costs of monitoring by the principal.
37. Indeed, a variety of scholars have also pointed out the independent influence of government agencies in perverting implementation of government programs. Because of their differential access to information regarding the facts of the substantive programs over which they have
responsibility, they are thought to skew the policy agenda in favor of maximizing the agency
budget or furthering its bureaucrats' career goals. See R. ARNOLD, CONGRESS AND THE BUREAUCRACY (1979); G. BENVENISTE, BUREAUCRACY 71-111 (1977); D. MUELLER, PUBLIC
CHOICE 156-70 (1979); W. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
(1971).
Obviously, the two circumstances are related: the influence of special interest groups in the
formulation and execution of policy is in part due to their powers in affecting the initial political
judgment. Nevertheless, control over information and contacts can be important in legislation
and administration for reasons unrelated to the electoral influence of special interest groups;
administrative and executive actors may be dependent on contacts and knowledge obtained by
those most knowledgeable in the area. In addition, those most likely to pay attention to what
administrative and legislative officials are doing, and to alert the public or special interest groups
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C. Solutions to the Special Interest Group Problem
To overcome· the lack of informational parity among diffuse and
concentrated groups in these various contexts, and to surmount the
general lack of incentive to generate political information, several
scholars, relying on law-and-economics theories, have defended a variety of political institutions and legal mechanisms that would expand
political information. 38 The most important is disclosure of government activities, on the ground that enforcement and disclosure will
improve diffuse groups' oversight of governmental activities. Because
obtaining information is more costly for diffuse groups, and because
monitoring government is more difficult for such entities, it becomes
important for information to be available at no cost. "By supporting
the freedoms of speech and press," it is suggested, "one can increase
the likely caliber of [rationality] in political action by increasing the
availability of free and relatively inexpensive information. " 39 While
"[i]ndividuals may not seek information, [they] may process it if it is
very easily acquired." 40
A similar analysis has also been used to support recent law-andeconomics proposals to transform the nature of statutory construction
and judicial review. 41- Like the first amendment scholarship, the assumption of this approach is that "citizens have poor information
about the actions of legislators" and "legislators have few incentives to
when policies diverge from what was intended, can be important and powerful groups to these
officials.
38. To be sure, there are cases where the economics literature recognizes that less information can be advantageous even apart from the costs of generating it. See, e.g., Hirshleifer, supra
note 25, at 568. In addition, it should be recognized that market participants who possess less
information can sometimes rely on the superior knowledge of others. See Schwartz & Wilde,
Intervening in Markets on the Basis of lmpelfect Information, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 638
(1979); McKelvey & Ordeshook, Information, Electoral Equilibria, and the Democratic Ideal, 48
J. PoL. 909 (1986) (arguing that under certain conditions uninformed voters can rely on polls of
public opinion instead of candidates' declared positions to decide for whom to vote). Indeed,
some of the arguments set forth in this article and in the traditional party literature are consistent
with these observations.
39. Oppenheimer, supra note 26, at 253.
40. Id. Thus, the first amendment and disclosure requirements regarding legislative and ad·
ministrative operations can all serve to increase the availability of such information, and, in so
doing, supposedly improve the relative ability of diffuse groups to participate effectively in
government.
41. The subject of statutory construction has enjoyed a resurgence in recent years, much of it
with the goal of using varying techniques to improve judicial decisionmaking. See, e.g., Eskridge,
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987); Eskridge, Public Values in
Statutory Constructin, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1007 (1989). Some interesting scholarship, however,
especially that of Jon Macey and Susan Rose-Ackerman, suggests that interpreting legislntion
according to its publicly stated goals can overcome the informational disadvantages of diffuse
groups in overseeing legislative deliberations. See Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986);
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 25.
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reveal deals that would not be obvious to superficial observers."42 To
overcome this deficiency, "[t]he aim of judicial review should ... be to
make legislators more responsible to the electorate by assuring that
information about legislative bargains is more likely available, [improving the public's] capacity to monitor the output of congressional
bargains."43 Courts should thus construe statutes according to their
"public" explanations, rather than according to their technical terms
or deals that were supposedly formulated behind the scenes, thereby
serving to equalize the ability of diffuse groups and more concentrated
groups to oversee legislative deliberations. In this way, statutory construction would improve the informational abilities of the diffuse public to monitor government, helping to minimize the organizational
advantages of special interest groups. 44
Finally, a related analysis has been applied by administrative law
scholars to the monitoring of government bureaucracies. As noted
above, although delegation is intrinsic to operations in the Post-New
Deal state, execution will necessarily involve a deviation from the initial legislative judgment. This deviation, moreover, can be affected dif~
ferentially by special interest groups. 45 While the proposed solutions
to this problem have been varied, many scholars express a common
approach and purpose: to increase the oversight of administrative
agencies so as to counteract the differential informational advantage of
special interest groups. The most important such proposed technique
is to make decisionmaking by administrative agencies more open to
the public through "hard look" judicial review, enhanced procedures
under the Administrative Procedures Act, and supplementation of intervention rights. 46 A variation on this theme is to improve the accessibility of executive information to legislative review by expanding the
requirements of the Freedom of Information Act, and, perhaps, by
expanding legislative oversight.47 Finally, some have argued that pres42. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 25, at 349. Rose-Ackerman also urges courts to "encourage
deliberation" in Congress, thereby making a direct link between the law-and-economics and civic
virtue approaches.
43. Id. at 351.
44. A visible institution such as the presidency is also supposed to help overcome the relative
organizational disadvantages of diffuse groups by surmounting their informational and. transactional disadvantage$ through visibility and ease of monitoring. See Fitts, Vices of Virtue, supra
note 11, at 1606.
45. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
46. See Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669,
1782 (1975); Bruff, supra note 28, at 248 ("modern legal requirementS defining administrative
rationality share with legislative formality the effect of ensuring that public policy will be supported by coalitions representing a set of values that is relatively widely accepted").
47. See, e.g., Kronman, The Privacy Exemption to the Freedom of Information Act, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 727, 734 (1980).
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idential oversight of administrative agencies, through such techniques
as enhanced review of agency regulations, can provide the needed expansion of diffuse political oversight necessary to counteract the organizational advantages of special interest groups. 48
II. THE VALUE OF INFORMATION UNDER THE
CIVIC VIRTUE MODEL

Although civic virtue scholars come to these issues from a markedly different perspective from the approach discussed above, many
also appear to be exploring different mechanisms for stimulating the
production and dissemination of information among political institutions. 49 According to this viewpoint, a major purpose of government
is to create a full and developed dialogue among political and social
actors representing a rich diversity of social, economic, and ideological
viewpoints. so

A. An Overview
At its core, the philosophical concern of civic virtue is the influence of self-interest in political decisionmaking. In this sense, it is di48. See Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking. 88 YALE L.J. 451 (1979);
Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. EcoN. &
ORG. 81 (1985); Pierce, The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64
TEXAS L. REV. 469, 520-24 (1985); Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 663-64 (1984). Although all of these
proposals may in their specific requirements lead to different policy outcomes, their common
underlying goal is to improve political oversight of administrative behavior by disseminating
greater public information about government activities, thereby overcoming the collective action
problems of information acquisition and counterbalancing the differential advantage of the spe·
cial interest groups in influencing administrative behavior.
49. See generally Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988) (summarizing civic republican approach to political institutions). In the following discussion I will
focus prinpipally on Sunstein's scholarship, both because he appears to have become a "leader"
of this approach, and because he consciously and thoughtfully seeks to summarize and rationalize a broad spectrum of legal opinions and secondary literature focusing on the structure of
political institutions. Where applicable, I will note differences between his approach and that of
others writing in the tradition. Frank Michelman, for example, appears to focus more on the
Supreme Court, rather than political institutions generally, as the center of the civic virtue dialogue. See Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term - Foreword: Traces ofSelf Government,
JOO HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986) [hereinafter Michelman, Traces of Self-Government]. But cj
Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1531 (1988) (appearing to recognize a more
institutionally pluralist conception of dialogue).
50. See generally Sunstein, supra note 49; Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101
HARV. L. REV. 421, 429, 510 (1987) (simultaneous presidential, legislative, and judicial control
can, "by proliferating the points of access to government ... , increase the opportunity for
groups to seek and obtain reform" and "bring about something close to the safeguards of the
original constitutional framework"). Sunstein has also argued for a dispersal of power in administration because, as in the case of separate branches, usually "at least one branch will be responsive to the interests of politically weak groups and thus will become an advocate for reform." Id.
at 489-90.
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rected toward one of the same goals that led Rawls to develop his
heuristic device, "the original p,0sition" 51 ..:___to make decisionmakers
"think from the point of view of everybody." 52 Because of the social
biases created by individuals' knowledge of their own social positions
and the effect of agreements on their individual welfare, Rawls originally proposed the veil as a mental filter that would serve to excise
decisiomiiakers' knowledge of their own place in society and their own
belief systems. 53
1
The value of this device in stimulating a "true" dialogue has been
questioned, however, on the grounds that the original position appears
to excise important information about decisionmakers as real people.
How, it has been asked, can a normatively attractive social consensus
be achieved by disembodied individuals lacking knowledge of real people and their human motivation - "good" or "bad"?54 In short,
"[f]or republicans, the problem with the original position as a guide to
political institutions or as a political ideal is that it is too solitary and
insufficiently dialogic. "55
In their design of political institutions, therefore, civic virtue scholars seek to create a rational dialogue through the opposite technique:
lead decisionmakers in the real world, obviously possessing full knowledge of their own social positions and_ belief systems, to engage in the
type of normative discussion that Rawls believed would occur behind
the veil. In this case, however, the bias of political actors' social backgrounds would be overcome by increasing the number of dialogic par51. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-12 (1971).
52. Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1569 (quoting Okin, Reason and Feeling in Thinking about
Justice, 99 ETHICS 229 (1989)). Of course, the veil can further other purposes as well.
53. J. RAWLS, supra note 51, at 17-22.
54. See generally L. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 59-66 (1987); M.
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1984); Nagel, Rawls on Justice, in READING RAWLS 8-10 (N. Daniels ed. 1975). The veil of ignorance, it also has been argued, incorrectly portrays man as a narcissistic, nonvirtuous decisionmaker, who can engage in public
responsibilities and decisionmaking only if he is unaware of its impact on his own interests.
55. Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1571 (footnote omitted); cf. Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986
Term - Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 60 n.240 (1987) (Rawls "assumes a single and universal perspective from which all expectations can be discerned" and is
"insufficiently sensitive to the possibility of competing perspectives").
This does not suggest that Rawls' overall theory is inconsistent with the civic virtue perspective. For one, the veil is a device ultimately intended to inform the situated reader - as a
thought experiment. See, e.g., Baker, Sandel on Rawls, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 895, 898 (1985);
Okin, Reason and Feeling in Thinking and Justice, 99 ETHICS 229, 246 (1989). In addition,
Rawls does not suggest the veil of ignorance should be recreated in existing political institutions,
only used as a heuristic device for thinking about a just structure for society. See J. RAWLS,
supra note 51, at 195 (discussing application of principles of justice to structure of political institutions). For this reason, it can reasonably be argued that civic virtue is a consistent extension of
the Rawlsian 11pproach to the structure of political institutions. See Sunstein, supra note 49, at
1567 n.160, 1571 n.183.
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ticipants and expanding the information base. Political actors would
thus "generate institutions that will produce deliberation among
the differently situated, . not mimic decisions . . . made by the
unsituated. " 56
The difference in technique between the Rawlsian veil of ignorance
and rational dialogue under the civic virtue model should be underscored. 57 The structure of the veil of ignorance presumes that decisionmaking may be improved and dialogue promoted by excising
information - that is, by disembodying individuals from knowledge
of their society and values. The approach of civic virtue theory, however, views dialogue from a different perspective: the presumption is
that a rational dialogue cannot take place absent knowledge of one's
values and society. To ensure that real-world decisionmaking will not
be biased, or at least that the bias will be reduced, civic virtue relies on
a social dialogue encompassing a wide variety of individuals from different perspectives and walks of life. The resulting exchange and expansion of information, it is supposed, will lead participants to
broaden their perspectives and "think from the point of view of everyone" - largely what the veil is intended to achieve. 58 Quite simply,
under the civic virtue view, "the purpose of politics is ... the transformation of private interests into public interests through discussion and
persuasion. " 59
B. Legal Application

To achieve these goals, the civic virtue literature generally explores
a variety of new or expanded doctrines and institutions that would
ensure diverse informational inputs. As a general matter, these doc56. Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1571; see also id. at 1575, 1586 (footnotes omitted):
Impartiality within republican theories . . . require public-regarding justifications offered
after multiple points of view have been consulted and (to the extent possible) genuinely
understood.
[T]he basic constitutional institutions of federalism, bicameralism, and checks and balances share some of the appeal of proportional representation, ..• proliferat[ing] the points
of access to government, increasing the ability of diverse groups to influence policy, multiplying perspectives in government, and improving deliberative capacities.
Sunstein also remarks that "politics should ... allow for a measure of critical distance from and
scrutiny of [citizen] desires, bringing new information and different perspectives to bear." Id. at
1544; see also Michelman, Traces ofSelf-Government, supra note 49, at 76 ("The norm of justice
to parties itself commands that no other norm should ever take a form that preempts questions or
exempts from reason-giving.").
57. Indeed, as will be seen, the difference has practical significance because real-world attempts to further dialogue on one dimension may be in tension with techniques used to further it
along another. See infra notes 212-17 and accompanying text.
58. See Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1569 (quoting Okin, supra note 55, at 229).
59. Mashaw, supra note 25, at 130.
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trines and institutions would serve to proliferate the points of access to
government and disperse power, thereby increasing the opportunity
for different groups to find institutional representation within the fed- .
eral government and to participate in public dialogue. Recent proposals for supplementing checks and balances; facilitating independent
and "insulated" political representation; promoting "consistency" and
"high visibility" in statutory construction; requiring proportional representation; and ensuring presidential, judicial, and legislative participation in and oversight of administrative decisionmaking are all
intended to expand and diversify expressed opinions. 60
These proposals are outgrowths of earlier doctrinal developments
in administrative, first amendment, and race discrimination law. In
administrative law, the so-called "hard-look" doctrine and earlier attempts to expand procedures and supplement intervention by a wide
variety of groups were originally advanced on the ground that they
would force agency officials to engage in a dialogue with the courts
and other social actors. 61 This exchange, overseen by the courts, was
intended to force agency officials to come to understand the limitations
of their own position as well as to reveal any blatantly improper or
illicit motives. 62 Similarly, first amendment and race discrimination
law has on oc~asion sought to force public decisionmakers to reveal
and explain their reasons for acting to extend a benefit, thereby help60. See Fitts, Vices of Virtue, supra note 11, at 1586-92 (summarizing authors). See generally
Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, supra note 49, at 33 ("The dialogic themes express the
vision of social normative choice as participatory, exploratory, and persuasive, rather than specialized, deductive or demonstrative."); Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1557 ("Republicans envision
[the-government] process as a forum in which alternative perspectives and additional information
are brought to bear ... increasing available opportunities [for input] and information."). Of
course, this approach is not necessarily true of all writers who might be viewed as writing in the
civic virtue tradition. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE LIBERAL STATE
(1980) (developing a more objectively limited and nonculturally dependent conception of dialogue); Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, supra note 49 (appearing to develop a more
court-centered approach to dialogue).
61. Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1805, 1811-13 (1978); Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 1193, 1267-71, 1278-82 (1982); Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine,
1983 SUP. Cr. REV. 177, 182-83; see also Greater Boston Television Co. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841,
850-53 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). But see Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). See generally Tribe,
Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 301 (1975) (Structural due process
"envision[s] the Supreme Court as structuring a dialogue between the state and those whose
liberty its laws confine, a dialogue in which the continuing legitimacy of a law turns on the
current willingness and ability of the state to come forth with rational justifications for the law's
continued enforcement.").
62. See Sunstein, supra note 50, at 471 (concluding that the hard-look doctrine is "an effort
to 'flush out' illegitimate or unarticulated factors ... to ensure that those factors are available for
discussion and comment during and after the rulemaking process"); id. at 478 ("A firm judicial
hand has disciplined administrative outcomes by correcting parochial or ill-reasoned decisions
and serving as a significant deterrent.").
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ing to reveal whether or not the true motive for the government action
was a permissible one. 63 In general, the legal admonition that political
actors "listen" and "respond" to the arguments of others is the normative linchpin of the civic virtue perspective. By seeking to understand
and to converse with all relevant actors, decisionmakers should better
understand the limitations of their own viewpoint, both factually and
normatively. 64 While recognizing the clear "participation" benefits to
diverse informational inputs, 65 this approach focuses on the quality of
political decisions made in a framework of public dialogue.
Thus, while the standard law-and-economics and civic virtue analyses of the public interest are often treated as antagonistic, they have a
common perspective on the issue of information. Both generally favor
increased levels of information - either through the government's
production of information and the assignment of property rights (the
law-and-economics view), or tJ:ie proliferation of the points of access
to government (the civic virtue view). The law-and-economics approach emphasizes the utilitarian value of information - its ability to
reveal productive or exchange opportunities for furthering means/end
rationality. Civic virtue, on the other hand, views the elucidation of
opinions primarily as serving a value-based function, leading people
(by the exchange of information and ideologies) to recognize the bias
of their own positions, and to change their preferences or values that is, to help identify ends. Taken together, however, these two traditions show that information can be of benefit normatively as well as
instrumentally. 66
63. See, e.g.. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 532, 548-54 (1980) (Stevens, J,, dissent·
ing); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103, 114-17 (1976); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S.
558 (1948); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); see also Monaghan, First Amendment
"Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1970). But see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972) (procedural due process does not require hearing of first amendment claim by fired state
employee absent entitlement). Similarly, the protection of "public discourse" under the first
amendment is quite compatible with the civic virtue approach. See, e.g.. Post, The Constitutional
Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Maga·
zine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1990).
64. See generally Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93
HARV. L. REV. l, 4 (1979); Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in NOMOS XVIII: DUE PROCESS 126, 127 (1977); Tribe, supra note 61; Tribe, The Emerg-

ing Reconnection of Individual Rights and Institutional Design: Federalism, Bureaucracy and
Due Process of Lawmaking, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 433, 444 (1977); Weisberg, The Calabresian
Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1983) (discussing the
"new legal process" view of dialogue); Ackerman, Why Dialogue?, 86 J. PHIL. S (1989).
65. See, e.g., Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61
B.U. L. REV. 885 (1981).
66. Of course, there are potential differences. For example, proliferating points of access can
in some cases diminish the amount of information, or at least merely change the type of information, rather than increase its overall level.
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III. LIMITED INFORMATION AS A POSITIVE INFLUENCE IN
DECISIONMAKING: THE UTILITARIAN VALUE OF PARTY
IDENTIFICATION AND RELATED INSTITUTIONS
Despite these important arguments in favor of more information,
less information can be advantageous along several dimensions, even
when viewed in light of the goals articulated by the civic virtue and
law-and-economics traditions. A variety of legal and political institutions that serve to create less information are useful in pursuing some
of the long-term goals of one or both traditions. This Part focuses on
the utilitarian benefits of party identification and limited information
as devices for improving reasoning processes (section III.A), overcoming perverse interest group incentives (section III.B), and avoiding
political stalemate (section III.C). These are models one, two, and
three, as sketched earlier in this article. 67 I also consider the significance of these effects to several possible governmental reforms (section
IIl.D), and the problems they can present to the civic virtue and lawand-economics perspectives (section III.E).
A. Limited Information as a Value in Promoting Rational
Decisionmaking (Model I)
At first glance, it is difficult to understand how less information
can improve reasoning processes. As noted above, under a traditional
economic or utilitarian model of decisionmaking, each new piece of
information should be integrated according to its probative impact on
events and marginal judgments; the information should enhance
rather than undermine utilitarian decisionmaking. Since, under this
analysis, "the costs of information acquisition and transmission and
the costs of search are the only factors that limit the quest for more
information," 68 expansion of information should be presumptively advantageous. Similarly, under a value-based view of rational dialogue,
the greater the number of perspectives, the less likely should be the
bias or irrationality of the ultimate judgment. 69 Thus, generally speaking, more information should improve ethical decisionmaking as well.
Diverse literatures from social psychology, philosophy and organization theory, however, indicate that this process can be more complicated than this general description suggests. In situations of high
67. See supra text accompanying notes 12-16.
68. L. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 12 (emphasis added).
69. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. Of course, there are some limits on public
discourse, at least according to some civic republicans. See Michelman, Laws Republic, supra
note 49, at 1527 (public discourse should not be "considered or experienced as coercive, or invasive, or otherwise a violation of one's identity or freedom").
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complexity or uncertainty, 70 decisionmakers are often aided by "heuristic" devices, which affect the use of information in two different and
subtle ways. 71 First, a heuristic boils down a complex of information
into a shorthand analytic framework. 72 Economists would view this
process as decreasing the marginal costs of transmitting the information, though the number of actual verbal communications (that is, the
amount of dialogue, in a colloquial sense) would ordinarily be reduced
as well. 73 Second, and more importantly, in order to facilitate analysis
of the information actually transmitted, the heuristic also serves to exclude some information. This limitation, in fact, is a precondition to
effective comprehensive analysis. As Christopher Schroeder has observed, "comprehensive rationality ... reduces choice to an analysis of
the efficacy of available alternatives to achieve predetermined goals ...
inevitably entail[ing] simplification, both in the specification of goals
and in the modeling methods employed to predict the extent to which
alternatives achieve them." 74 In the absence of such limitations, deci70. The problems of rational decisionmaking in such situations have been extensively investigated. See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (D.
Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds. 1982); Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice and the
Framing ofDecisions, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSY·
CHOLOGY 67 (R. Hogarth & M. Reder eds. 1987). As Daniel Farber observes, decisionmakers
"systematically deviate from rationality in considering combinations of risks; they ignore background information in assessing new data; and they are easily swayed by trivial changes in the
presentation of information." Farber, Environmentalism, Economics, and The Public Interest, 41
STAN. L. REV. 1021, 1035 (1989).
71. For a discussion of the value of limited information in organization theory, see D.
BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION 53 (1963); ]. MARCH & H. SIMON,
ORGANIZATIONS 203-04 (1958); H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 80-83 (1976); H. SI·
MON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1982); A. WILDAVSKY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO
POWER: THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY ANALYSIS 36 (1979).
72. Sociologists might call this an ideal-type. See supra note 20.
73. This process is the basis of decreased "costs" in an economic sense. In an informationally perfect world, the heuristic would serve as a "sufficient statistic." See B. LINDGEN, STATIS·
TICAL THEORY 191-205 (1962).
74. Schroeder, Rights Against Risk, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 495, 502 n.29 (1986). In other
words, the process of comprehensive rational decisionmaking itself, as the philosophers of the
social science and organization theory point out, requires a dwarfing of marginal variables to
facilitate analysis. For a law-and-economics explanation of this process, see A.M. POLINSKY,
supra note 21, at 4 ("The art of economics is picking assumptions that simplify a problem enough
to better understand certain features of it, without inevitably causing those features to be unimportant ones."); R. POSNER, supra note 21, at 16 ("[A]bstraction - reductionism, if you like is the essence of scientific inquiry. A scientific theory must select from the welter of experience
that it is trying to explain .... ")(footnote omitted). For an organization-theory explanation, see
D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, supra note 71, at 117 {"The synoptic approach makes such
comprehensive demands for information and analysis that theories are desperately needed merely
to discipline the gathering of information and to organize the multiple implications of whatever
evidence is gathered."); A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 71, at 36 ("[A]nalysis welcomes constraints.
If everything is seen as possible, nothing can be done."); J. MARCH & H. SIMON, supra note 71,
at 139 ("Choice is always exercised with respect to a limited, approximate, simplified 'model' of
the real situation"). A somewhat similar tradeolf is presented in the choice between rulemaking
and adjudication in administrative law. Cf Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administratfre
Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 430 (1981).
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sionmakers often cannot engage in effective analysis, tending (in a type
of information overload) to miss "the forest for the trees" and to use
the greater information in a stochastic manner. 75
1.

The Value of Party Identification and Related Party Structures

Although the significance of heuristics and information overload in
a variety of contexts is a subject of legitimate controversy, 76 two of the
most important tools of national political organization - strong parties and party identification - appear to serve this function both in
theory and in practice. As I have argued previously, political parties
are rightfully praised for their ability to disseminate their message
broadly to the public. 77 At the same time, however, their power and
influence is also achieved_ - especially at the national level - by channeling and implicitly red~cing the number of public communications
about political actors, programs, and policies. The reason this occurs
is that political parties seek to focus the public's attention on a visible
cue - party identification - which is intended both to simplify a vast
amount of information about individual candidates, and, in order that
it will be understood and followed, to overshadow and dwarf the static
of individual political communications. 78 "[P]olitical parties
75. See, e.g., D. BRAYBROOKE & c. LINDBLOM, supra 71, at 51, 113, 117; A. WILDAVSKY,
supra note 71, at 32, 36; D. KATZ & R. KAHN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS
507 (2d ed. 1978); J. STEINBRUNER, CYBERNETIC THEORY OF DECISION 12 (1974). Indeed,
investigations in the natural sciences may involve something like the same process. See T.
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE Of SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
76. Compare Grether, Schwartz & Wilde, The Irrelevance ofInformation Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1986) (criticizing use of information
overload analysis in legal context) with Edwards & von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and Their
Implications for the Law, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 225 (1986) (suggesting application ot psychological
literature to the law).
77. See Fitts, Vices of Virtue, supra note 11, at 1606. What follows is not intended to deny
the importance of this fundamental advantage. Rather, I outline here the related positive benefits
of the channeling (and implicit limiting) of information undertaken by some political parties.
78. See D. PRICE, BRINGING BACK THE PARTIES 110 (1984); Popkin, Gorman, Phillips &
Smith, What Have You Done For Me Lately? Toward An Investment Theory of Voting, 70 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 779, 780 (1976); see also infra note 138.
Of course, it can be argued that parties should not be dependent on limited information once
the party label has been established in the public consciousness. Under this reasoning, while
party identification does depend on a heuristic label that inherently simplifies and limits information and communications, once that label is publicized and understood, the public should then
simply evaluate the complex world of diverse communications in light of the label, through a
type of reflective equilibrium. As a factual matter, however, this bifurcated process is difficult to
achieve: the proliferation of informational inputs appears to overwhelm the label in a type of
information overload. Moreover, given the limited amount of time the public has to spend listening to political communications, more time spent on individual communications necessarily
means less time spent on information about the party, and a reduced significance of the party
label. See M. WATTENBERG, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES (1984); Richardson, Constituency Candidates Versus Parties in Japanese Voting Behavior, 82 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 695, 700 (1988). While the public may be more capable of undertaking this effort now than
in the past, see Fitts, Vices of Virtue, supra note 11, at 1640 (summarizing authors), there is
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originated in large part from the need of voters for a guide, a set of
symbolic shortcuts, to the confusing and often trackless political terrain. "79 The simplification of the general wealth of political information in a party label can facilitate the ability of a diffuse public which often cares very little individually about those political events,
though very much in the aggregate - to follow political affairs. 80 In
short, because people are uninformed on most issues, "democracy
[may be] best served by reducing and simplifying those choices to a
single electoral choice." 8 I
Based on this benefit, the traditional party identificatiop, which
was generally criticized during the 1950s and 1960s, 82 has now garnered some academic respectability and praise, as have political parties
as organizations structurally impelled to create this symbol. 83 Faced
with the necessity of forging a program and platform attractive to a
majority of the population and capable of rationalizing the running of
government, party forces must draw connections between issues, programs, and interests that may not be apparent in the din of diverse,
decentralized individual political conversation, but would nevertheless
be attractive to a winning coalition. By drawing these linkages, party
forces serve to highlight the interrelationship between issues - that is,
to create a heuristic device. Moreover, while the political party organization itself obviously creates some new information - the party label - it succeeds in getting the public to understand and use that label
partly by simplifying (and, in so doing, necessarily limiting) the wealth
of political information about candidates and government. In effect,
party identification is maintained by the fact that the party exercises
greater control than individual politicians over political resources and
communications. The result is that political events are more accessicontinuing indication that it has difficulty keeping abreast of political events and is advantaged
by the party label, see E. SMITH, THE UNCHANGING AMERICAN VOTER (1989).
79. F. SAUROF & P. BECK, PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA 503 (6th ed. 1988). Indeed, party
identification has been aptly described as the "party in the electorate." Id. at 160.
80. In contrast to more concentrated special interest groups, the diffuse public simply cannot
take the time, and in some cases does not have the ability regardless of time, to engage in rational
political dialogue or to understand marginal utilities or benefits of alternative policies. Given the
collective action problem of political mobilization, it is not rational for the public to expend
much effort. The party label is an important shorthand device enabling diffuse publics to deal
with public issues in a modem industrial society.
81. J. WILSON, THE AMATEUR DEMOCRAT 343 (1962); see also M. McGERR, THE DE·
CLINE OF POPULAR POLITICS 206 (1986) (noting that decline of partisanship "presented a complex, less accessible political world"}.
82. See, ~g., A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE, W. MILLER & D. STOKES, THE AMERICAN
VOTER (1960).
83. See, e.g., Popkin, Gorman, Phillips & Smith, supra note 78.

April 1990]

Veils of Ignorance

943

ble and more important to the public. 84
Some critics correctly question the ability of the public to agree on
the party linkages at various times, rightly observing that the question
is one of balance between simplification and specification. 85 Certainly,
American history includes examples of groups, especially blacks, that
were excluded from political debate and power partly by the duopoly
of a two-party system. Despite this, however, the simplification of
party labels has also served at times to promote public understanding
of political events, especially among less educated and poorer
groups. 86 To the extent that the voting public focuses on this information, and is less likely to dwell on the often confusing static of diverse
individual political conversations, the instrumental rationality of its
decisions can be improved. s1
84. See M. McGERR, supra note 81, at 134 ("Traditional party journalism ... eased readers'
participation in politics by creating an accessible political world[;] [p]arty papers made politics
seem important, simplified issues, [and] encouraged the public to judge men and measures with
the yardstick of partisanship ...."); R. ENTMAN, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT CITIZENS 137 (1989)
("The decline of participation in the U.S. has historically paralleled the dwindling of the partisan
press and the rise of objectivity.").
85. Sees. SAUROF & P. BECK, supra note 79, at 58 (1988); A. WARE, CITIZENS, PARTIES
AND THE STATE 238 (1987); Miller, supra note 31. Indeed, Morris Fiorina, who has written
extensively about the importance of strengthening party organization, has recently noted that
some of the breakdown of party influence may simply be a result in part of popular preference for
divided government. See Fiorina, An Era ofDivided Government, in DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN POLITICS (B. Caine & G. Peele eds.) (forthcoming 1990).
86. The binary choice offered in two-party rule may also be one means for overcoming the
social costs of political Condorcet cycling, the endless voting cycle created when voting is multipeaked. See H. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 111-15 (1984); P. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND
POLITICAL THEORY 56-59 (1988). This is not only because political parties exercise agenda
control, thereby eliminating such cycling, but also because a socialization process may occur that
will make positions among political actors more "single peaked," and thus not subject to cycling.
As Albert Weale has observed, "The effect of a two-party system is to force voters to think of
issues in the same way, namely in terms ofa choice between party A and party B." Weale, Social
Choice Versus Populism? An Interpretation of Riker's Political Theory, 14 BR. J. PoL. SCI. 369,
373 (1984); cf. Mashaw, supra note 48, at 99 (noting that dialogue can produce single peaked
distribution in some contexts). From the perspective of some legal academicians exploring literary theory, political parties might also be a means of helping to forge a rough type of interpretative community, which can be viewed as a prerequisite to meaningful group dialogue or
understanding. See Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 745 (1982) (observing that interpretation can be objective within a given legal interpretative community). Of
course, there is a fundamental question whether an interpretative community in the literary or
philosophical sense can or should be established in the political or legal system. See Kahn, Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE L.J. 1 (1989); Mann, The Universe and
the Library: A Critique of James Boyd White as Writer and Reader, 41 STAN. L. REV. 959
(1989). See also Post, supra note 63 (discussing some of the tension between community and
civic dialogue in the first amendment context).
87. Indeed, this benefit might be understood in terms quite compatible with some aspects of
economic and civic virtue theory - namely, the value of a principal/agency relationship between
the public and government officials. For the economics theory, see Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. EcoN. REV. 777 (1972); Jensen &
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. EcoN. 305 (1976). For the civic virtue theory, see Sunstein, Interest Groups in American
Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 69-72 (1985); Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public
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2. Party Identification and Public Dialogue

The simplification of political dialogue inherent in party identification has historically provided another instrumental benefit: improved
"communication" between government and the public, and, in this
sense, enhanced government accountability to public judgments, especially those of the poor. 88 In a dispersed environment of diverse political dialogue, the meaning of electoral events is more often unclear, as
hundreds of individual candidate peculiarities determine particular
electoral decisions with respect to congressional seats and state offices.
This is especially true because voting is disproportionately retrospective, with voters responding best to clear government actions,· 89 in a
government of dispersed powers, government actions are less likely to
be the subject of popular affirmation or retribution, since no individual
government official or party controls government sufficiently to be
held responsible and subject to clear retrospective evaluation. 90 Political parties, to the extent they control government, can serve as a
structure that frames issues and programs in clear and simple terms
for the whole public. 91 While there may be a reduction in rational
dialogue in a legal or philosophical sense, which cannot be ignored,
there can be a quite different benefit in systemic political accountability - in a sense, mass public communication and dialogue through the
Choice, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 873, 912 n.224 (1987). In the eyes of many political scientists, strong
party identification effectively limits popular oversight of day-to-day government activities, reducing political evaluations to general retrospective assessments about whether the party is acting consistently with the voters' general views and interests. See M. FlORlNA, RETROSPECTIVE
VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS (1981); V.0. KEY, THE RESPONSIBLE ELECTO·
RATE (1964). In this sense, it establishes a principal/agency relationship between the people and
their government, necessarily giving' the agent (that is, government leaders) some leeway. To the
extent that the public is better at evaluating the general results of government actions, than at
guiding specific future strategies, the generality of party identification may offer an advantage in
promoting long-term rationality in voting.
88. See Fitts, Vices of Virtue, supra note 11, at 1639-43.
89. See V.O. KEY, supra note 84, at 63 ("[T]he major streams of shifting voters graphically
reflect the electorate in its great, and perhaps principal role as an appraiser of past events, past
performance, and past actions. It judges retrospectively; it commands prospectively only insofar
as it expresses either approval or disapproval of that which has happened before."); M. FlORINA,
supra note 87, at 5-6; cf. J. CLUBB,
FLANIGAN & N. ZINGALE, PARTISAN REALIGNMENT:
VOTERS, PARTIES AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 30-32, 267 (1980) (arguing that
the major realignments in American political history depend on rejection and affirmation by the
electorate of the parties' actions in power).
90. As V.O. Key wrote, "[t]he vocabulary of the voice of the people consists mainly of the
words 'yes' and 'no.'"
KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS 544 (5th ed.
1964).
91. Of course, dialogue between courts and Congress has been a frequent subject of academic
analysis. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 26 (1962); Bickel & Wellington,
Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14-35
(1957); L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES (1988). The literature on party organization
suggests that, at least in a systemic sense, this conversation may be undermined for the public by
the decline of parties.

w.
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electoral system. 92
To be sure, no one suggests that party identification is a perfect
heuristic.93 As a practical matter, no such device can exist. 94 By defi92. Indeed, along these same lines, there is some possibility that this simplification may have
a significant effect on the ability of the political system to enter into high politics, that is, to
precipitate what political scientists call a critical election, one of those rare constitutional movements which is the basis for Bruce Ackerman's proposed system of judidal review. See Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1049-51, 1053-54
(1984) (claiming that the role of the courts is to perfect the political understanding reached
during prior periods of "high politics"); see also Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional
Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989). Several scholars believe that a prerequisite to high politics is
political control and accountability of government in one party's hands, such that the party's
actions can become the subject of a comprehensive public retrospective evaluation. With the
breakdown of the parties, there is some doubt whether in the future our political system will be
able to precipitate as easily such high political debate, at least in a critical election sense. See D.
BRADY, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND CONGRESSIONAL POLICY-MAKING 165-66, 179 (1988); W.
BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 191 (1970);
J. CLUBB, W. FLANIGAN & N. ZINGALE, supra note 89, at 161-62 (1980) ("[U]nified and sustained partisan control of government was a necessary and obvious condition for the policy innovations we usually see as the products of partisan realignments."); R. RUBIN, PRESS, PARTY,
AND THE PRESIDENCY 216-17 (1981). If true, this structural change may also suggest that
events like the failed Supreme Court nomination of Judge Robert Bork are a result of the traditional testing of the high political ·moment, as Ackerman argues, see Ackerman, Transformative
Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164 (1988), but are also influenced by the breakdown of
political parties, which makes it structurally more difficult for the "moment" to engulf all
branches today.
93. Scholars have explored other types of heuristics, although they have been considered far
more controversial. During the 1950s, a variety of political scientists, reacting in part to the rise
of Nazi Germany and to McCarthyism, criticized the ideological bent of American politics, fearing that an ideological debate among the "masses" would promote McCarthyism and perhaps
lead to fascism. See M. ROGIN, THE INTELLECTUALS AND McCARTHY: THE RADICAL SPECTER 16-18 (1967) (summarizing authors). While this literature clearly overstated its position, it
implicitly argued that the mass public needed a heuristic device by which it could rationally
judge political life. Free-wheeling discussion and dissemination of information, especially in an
abstract framework, supposedly obscured popular understanding of political events.
The solution traditionally offered to these difficulties was pluralism. A self-interested and
narrowly focussed debate, according to this thinking, would serve as an important heuristic to
channel political thinking. By keeping debate narrowly self-interested, it could facilitate the ability of the public, especially the poor and less educated, to participate effectively in politics. See
c. LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 229-32 (1965); M. RoGIN, supra. This
conclusion claimed some support from the literature favoring incremental decisionmaking in a
wide variety of public policy contexts as a means of improving rationality. See, e.g., D.
BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, supra note 71, at 243; Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling
Through," 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79, 86 (1959); see also Diver, supra note 74 (advocating the use
of incremental decisionmaking in all uncontroversial cases not threatening disastrous missteps or
disenfranchisement); Miller, supra note 31, at 736 ("[O]rganizations in a pluralist society have an
incentive to confine their actions to the businesslike pursuit of their narrow defining interests and
not to pursue broad ideological goals."). While the cost of this increase in control over immediate events was an abandonment of political debate over more long-term, philosophical issues, this
vice was supposed to have a potential virtue in political understanding and control.
Unfortunately, pluralism ignored or at least undervalued pervasive transaction costs, wealth
effects, and the philosophical and normative vacuity of self-interested thinking. See supra text
accompanying notes 26-31 and note 31. For this reason, while the normative defense of political
parties has sometimes accepted the value of self-interest as a rationalizing device, see Fitts, Vices
of Virtue, supra note 11, at 1641, many political scientists have advocated overcoming these other
criticisms of pluralism through a different heuristic device - party identification. This system
supposedly allows the public to have a manageable understanding of the comprehensive public
issues that some pluralists thought would overwhelm it.
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nition, a heuristic simplifies and abstracts from reality, based on the
decisionmaker's judgment as to what is important, as well as her need
to facilitate analysis of social problems.95 As civic-virtue and other
writers have pointed out repeatedly and correctly, existing social institutions and heuristic devices necessarily bias public judgments.96 Indeed, the argument on behalf of a two-party system (as opposed to a
one-party system) is based on the need for alternatives to and criticism
of a particular party perspective. 97 Ultimately, the question is one of
balance. The political party approach cautions, however, that a constant increase in_ the diversity of politiCal inputs, which check each
perspective with other perspectives, 98 will not eliminate the use of
heuristic devices; they are inherent in human processing of information.99 In the absence of strong parties and party labels, members of
the public may well generate their own types of anchoring devices
which can be worse.
94. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
95. This is perhaps one reason that some common law legal analysts and interdisciplinary
legal scholars criticize each other's analytic methodology as simplistic. On one level, they are
both correct, since all models simplify reality to facilitate understanding. See M. WEBER, METH·
ODOLOGY, supra note 20, at 20; cf B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CoNSTITU·
TION 10-15 (1977) (distinguishing between "scientific policymakers" and "ordinary observers" as
alternative paradigms of legitimate legal analysis); R. POSNER, supra note 21, at 16
("[A]bstraction - reductionism, if you like - is of the essence of scientific inquiry. A scientific
theory must select from the welter of experience that it is trying to explain, and it is therefore
necessarily unrealistic when compared directly to actual conditions.") (footnote omitted),
96. We all have come to understand the pervasive influence of anchoring phenomena and
social background in conceptual thinking. See C. BAKER, supra note 10, at 14-22; J. ELSTER,
SOUR GRAPES (1983); Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law. 5 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 1 (1975); Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129
(1986) (arguing that legal intervention despite private preferences may be justified when those
preferences depend on the legal and social orders). See generally K. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY
AND UTOPIA (1954); Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of
Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617 (1973).
97. See A. DOWNS, AN EcONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 140-41 (1957); E.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 11, at 60.
98. See Sunstein, supra note 96, at 1154 ("A political process that subjects private choices to
critical scrutiny will in this sense produce better laws than a process that takes them as exogenous."); Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, supra note 49, at 76 ("The norm of justice to
parties itself commands that no other norm should ever take a form that preempts questions or
exempts from reason-giving."); cf Minow, supra note 55, at 74 ("Justice depends on the possibility of conflicts among the values and perspectives that justice pursues.").
99. See sources cited supra note 71. As Cass Sunstein recognizes: "If the ideas of endogenous preferences and cognitive distortions are carried sufficiently far, it may be impossible to
describe a truly autonomous preference...• It is difficult indeed to generate a baseline from
which to describe genuine autonomy and an approach that tries to abstract entirely from social
pressures is unlikely to be fruitful." Sunstein, supra note 96, at 1170-71. Ultimately, political
understanding can benefit from organizing principles, ideal types, which facilitate understanding
of political action. Competing political parties perform this role for a modem industrial society,
See supra note 86 (discussing the possible need for an interpretative community to engage in
group dialogue).
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Limited Information as a Benefit in Promoting Utilitarian
Efficiency (Model II)

The political party literature thus indicates that less information
and party identification can serve as a heuristic device to simplify and
organize political information. This approach also suggests a second
possible utilitarian benefit to more limited information: niinimizing
groups' narrow pursuit of self-interest that, from a societal perspective, would have led to a reduction in social welfare through the process of universalism described above. Put another way, less
information may help forge a sense of collective responsibility, without
which the pursuit of self-interest may make many citizens worse off. 100
This is the classic prisoners' dilemma, which was described earlier as
Model II. 101
1.

The Influence of Special Interest Groups

As discussed above, a major reason often offered for the heightened
and potentially perverse influence of narrow constituencies in congiessional and administrative decisionmaking is the splintering of governmental power among different government actors. The increasing
independence of representatives within Congress is thought in many
cases to advantage narrow interest groups that can secure a legislative
foothold and trade that position for influence within the legislative
process. This independence is secured, to a large degree, by representatives delivering discrete services to their districts in the form of constituent services, pork-barrel legislation, or other concentrated
benefits. The cost of these services, however, is other constituent services and pork-barrel legislation obtained by other representatives so-called universalism - resulting in reduced social welfare. Once a
regime of universalism has been established, moreover, there is no basis for individual legislators or their constituents to opt out of the system.102 As in the prisoners' dilemma, many groups would be better
off, under this analysis, if representatives could reach a binding agreement to end the system.103
100. Limited information is beneficial for the individual in this context, it should be noted,
only if similarly situated political actors are also restrained by the information limitation, so as to
avoid the prisoners' dilemma. As in the case of the prisoner's dilemma there would be an individual instrumental advantage to this type of information. See supra note 15.
101. See supra notes 14-15 and llCCOmpanying text.
102. If the constituents should elect a civically virtuous representative, she alone would not
be able to change the nature of the regime or political bargains, but could only deprive her
constituents of their piece of the pie.
103. For a general description of this process, see L. DODD & R. SCHOTI, CONGRESS AND
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1979); M. FIORINA, supra note 30; Shepsle & Weingast, Legislative Politics and Budget Outcomes, in FEDERAL BUDGET POLICY IN THE 1980's 343 (1984).
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2. Party Identification

There is good reason to believe, however, that strong party identification (as well as strong party control over political resources that
help maintain that identification) may tend to reduce this problem,
especially at the national level. Strong parties, which control political
resources and create strong party identification, thereby diminish the
ability of legislative representatives to communicate effectively information to their constituents regarding any delivery by the representatives of special services peculiar to their particular districts. 104 In a
sense, strong party identification, which is created and reinforced by
strong party influences over communications, creates a verbal or psy~
chological centralization of authority by leading constituents not to
focus on any special services - individual or legislative - that might
be performed by their representatives, but rather to vote and debate on
the success or failure of the party as a whole. In this environment,
representatives obviously have less of an ability or incentive to spend
their time distinguishing themselves from the party or leaders and performing discrete legislative, constituent, or symbolic activities, 105 and
more reason to work with party leaders in favor of a general party
program for which they would be held accountable. 106 Although dialogue and information ordinarily are viewed as forging a sense of community, here the opposite can be true: the absence of information
From the opposite perspective, a more centralized government structure often appears to avoid
some of these problems. See Inman, Markets, Governments, and the "New" Political Economy, in
2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC EcoNOMICS 647, 692-739 (A. Auerbach & M. Feldstein eds. 1987)
(reviewing public choice literature on centralized rule); Inman, Federal Assistance and Local
Services in the United States: The Evolution ofa New Federal Fiscal Order, in FISCAL FEDERAL·
ISM AND QUANTITATIVE STUDIES (H. Rosen ed. 1988) (discussing the benefits of a majority rule
system, as opposed to a dispersed system, in federal grant programs); J. COGAN, THE EVOLU·
TION OF CoNGRESSIONAL BUDGET DECISIONMAKING AND THE EMERGENCE OF FEDERAL
DEFICITS (The Hoover Institution Working Paper No. E-88-33, 1988) (concluding that legislative decentralization has led to deficits).
104. To be sure, the traditional picture of the party machine is of an organization facilitating
graft. As the text suggests, however, party identification can obviate the need for the party to
undertake such distributions in order to maintain its strength.
105. As has been observed: "So long as individual candidates have some freedom to tailor
their positions to their particular districts, they will naturally be perceived more favorably than
an institution, such as Congress, or ... the chief executive, that in effect is constrained to adopt a
single national position." B. CAINE, J. FEREJOHN & M. FIORINA, THE PERSONAL VOTE 200
(1987).
106. See sources cited infra note 138. The textual argument, it should be noted, is the political counterpart of a negative-information thesis first put forward by economist Richard Hirshleifer in the case of certain types of insurance contracts. See Hirshleifer, supra note 25. As
Hirshleifer observed, market participants in insurance may be better off if precluded from securing information about future events that would merely have distributional consequences. The
reason is that the attempt to acquire the purely distributional information will lead to a social
deadweight loss. As a result, Hirshleifer reasoned, contrary to the classic economic analysis of
information, legal prohibitions on the acquisition of such information can enhance social utility.
Here, there may be similar utilitarian benefits to limited information in the public context.
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about individual actors and their distinctions may create a greater
sense of collective identity and responsibility. 107
Strong political parties and party identification help overcome this
problem, it is important to emphasize, by reducing the incentive of
narrow individual constituencies to act on information about their
self-interest. 108 To draw the crude analogy to public choice theory,
they should help solve the prisoners' dilemma by "depriving" the public within a particular congressional district of the information that its
political representative can offer a "special deal." 109 This lack of
knowledge helps to decrease the probability that the district will pursue its immediately apparent self-interest. The result is that individual
members of Congress are more likely to be held accountable for their
contribution to the general effectiveness of government performance
than for their narrow, marginal efforts to obtain special advantages for
their district or for individual constituents. All things being equal,
therefore, there is less reason for members of Congress to spend time
distinguishing themselves politically and symbolically from the rest of
their party. Rather, they will throw their support and assistance to
the party as a whole, since it is its success, ultimately, that is more
likely to ensure the individual's reelection. As a result, the political
influence of diffuse groups should be enhanced.
Indeed, an analogous argument has been made about the effect of
political parties and party identification on the incentive for political
actors to take actions with a longer time horizon. A political party
that exists as a stable institution extending across careers and political
generations may tend to mask the temporal distinctions between lead107. Of course, some believe there are potential benefits to the breakdown of party identification. The dispersion of influence and rise of independent political power accompanying the decline of parties facilitate greater dialogue between individual representatives within Congress and
between branches of government. Moreover, to the extent that universalism reigns in Congress,
it may improve the ability of narrower groups, such as traditionally excluded minorities, to secure some institutional representation within the polity, although, absent prejudice, narrow
groups are generally thought to enjoy organizational advantages in today's political process. See
Ackerman, supra note 28, at 745-46.
Finally, from the opposite perspective, the decentralization of power might be thought to
raise concerns of tyranny or of narrow groups gaining extra influence through their control of
centralized institutions. The political party's greater emphasis on centralization may not fully
resolve the internal question - what organization theory would call a principal/agency problem
- of ensuring that party leaders are responsive to their party constituents. The traditional view
is that a two party framework ensures a measure of accountability. See Fitts, Vice of Virtue,
supra note 11, at 1610-12.
108. Obviously, this is different from the typical law-and-economics or civic virtue solutions
that seek either to implement a tit-for-tat strategy or to instill altruism or virtue. See R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); R. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON (1988);
M. TAYLOR, ANARCHY AND COOPERATION (1976); Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 848-54, 859-62 (1980); Sunstein, supra note 87.
109. See supra note 15 (describing the prisoners' dilemma).
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ers of the same party. With this "ignorance" of personal differences
between party members, there can be less of an incentive, all things
being equal, to pass off budget deficits or other problems to future
party decisionmakers, who are linked to present political leaders by
party ties and popular party identification. In this type of environment, it is possible that the President and subordinates who will soon
become party leaders know that the public is more likely to hold the
party and future party leaders accountable for current policies. Parties and party identification thus would serve to help promote longer
temporal accountability by masking individual distinctions between
party successors. 110 To the extent that political parties decline as collective institutions extending across administrations and political personalities, this temporal accountability becomes more attenuated, if
not broken. Politicians can be more confident that successors within
the party will not be held responsible for earlier actions, thereby exacerbating any temporal collective action problems. 111
C. Limited Information and Nonideological Political Parties as a
Benefit in Overcoming Political Stalemate (Model III)
A third and related way that less information and stronger party
identification can benefit utilitarian decisionmaking is by obscuring the
existence of political divisions and issues, thereby facilitating agreement and political action. This is an example of Model III, as outlined
earlier. 112
110. As V.O. Key argued:
Expression of electoral disapprobation ... depends on the existence of political parties with
some continuity and some sense of corporate accountability. When a President seeks re·
election, he cannot avoid that accountability; his record is approved or it is not approved.
When the President's party puts forward a nominee as a successor to the incumbent, the
candidate must, if the electorate is to be effective, be accountable for the record of his party.
When such a presidential candidate seeks to work out of such responsibility, he attempts to
subvert a basic .tenet of the constitutional customs.
V.O. KEY, PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 474 n.3 (1961). See generally
Cremer, Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations, 101 Q.J. EcoN. 33 (1986).
111. The result could be a greater likelihood of such temporal collective action problems as
budget deficits. See Cogan, supra note 103 (linking the decline of parties to budget deficits). See
generally]. BUCHANAN & R. WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT: THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF
LORD KEYNES 17-18 (1977) (arguing that deficits are a result of temporal collective action
problems).
112. See supra text accompanying note 16. To some extent, the value of political parties in
improving the rationality of voting, see supra section III.A, while at the same time avoiding some
issues (as outlined here in section 111.C) might be seen as pursuing objectives that are potentially
in tension. A similar charge can be made against traditional defenses of pluralism. In this case,
however, political parties are thought to improve the rationality of voting about those issues on
the political agenda and to be better able to avoid other potentially destructive issues by keeping
them off the political agenda. Political party supporters would explain the difference as simply
"want[ing] to offer voters some choice but not (too much] choice." Orren, The Changing Styles
ofAmerican Party Politics, in THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES 4, 15 (J. Fleishman ed. 1982) (emphasis in original). As E.E. Schattschneider observed, "(d]emocracy is not to
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Of course, the need for agreement is relative and is ordinarily outweighed by the fundamental value in confronting 'and resolving social
issues. It can be necessary, however, to overcome the status quo by
prioritizing among the infinite number of controversies that can be
placed on the political agenda. Rawls, for example, has argued that
avoiding certain issues is a necessity in the modem liberal state. 113
This avoidance is achieved not only by explicit constitutional prohibition, such as the separation of church and state, 114 but also by the way
political institutions, such as strong parties and party identification,
are structured so as to keep political actors focused on some issues and
not on others - that is, to facilitate ignorance of some issues. This
process is similar to the manner in which party identification overcomes interest group universalism, except in this case party identification and other related devices can serve to overcome ideological and
other stalemates.
1.

The Literature on Nonideological Parties

This controversial argument can be traced to the pluralists, who
suggested that structures that keep debate focused on today's
problems, such as incremental budgeting systems, facilitate agreement
and government action. 115 Because any general rejection of comprebe found in the parties but between the parties." E. SCHATI'SCHNEIDER, supra note 11, at 60
(emphasis in original). In this sense, parties can be seen on some dimensions as facilitating political clarity - even ideology - and on other dimensions as removing issues from the political
agenda.
113. See Rawls, supra note 16; see also Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17 (1987) (calling for a "remov[al] from the political agenda [ofj the
most divisive issues, pervasive uncertainty and serious contention about which must undermine
the bases of social cooperation"). As Stephen Holmes has observed: "In a liberal social order,
the basic normative framework must be able to command the loyalty of individuals and groups
with widely differing self-understandings and conceptions of personal fulfillment. As a result,
theorists of justice can achieve their principal aim only by steering clear of irresolvable metaphysical disputes." Holmes, Gag Rules or the Politics of Omission, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
DEMOCRACY 19, 20-21 (J. Bister & R. Slagstad eds. 1988).
114. See Holmes, supra note 113, at 19-58 (discussing this and a variety of other legal techniques). Sunstein recognizes the benefits of omission in this special case. See Sunstein, supra
note 49, at 1555 n.85 ("[R]emoval of religion from the political agenda protects republican politics by ensuring against stalemate and factionalism.").
115. See A. WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (3d ed. 1979);
Wildavsky, Rescuing Policy Analysis from PPBS. 29 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 189 (1969); see also A.
BENTLY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT 447-59 (1908); R. DAHL, supra note 31, at 141-45; c.
LINDBLOM, supra note 93, at 3-34, 87-101; D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 501-35
(1951). But cf A. WILDAVSKY, THE "NEW" POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 423-26
(1988) (recognizing many of the trade-offs involved in this approach). While ignorance of longterm issues may minimize certain types of analysis, it can have advantages in reaching agreements where there is little to gain from increased scrutiny. Analogous arguments about ignorance facilitating moral consensus have been made in the private law literature. See, e.g., G.
CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 38-39 (1978).
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hensive analysis is highly questionable, 116 however, the political party
approach has pursued the benefits of less absolute limitations on
information.
Coalitional, as distinguished from ideological, politics is the best
example. According to this perspective, synoptic·ideological analysis
often stimulates informational inputs and conflict which can be profitably avoided through a more focused political process. In particular,
nonideological politics, which deemphasizes any overarching ideological framework, is thought to avoid raising some issues, thereby
"serv[ing] as a method for aggregating popular choices, tying these
conflicts over courses of action to a broader program, and ... making
compromise rather than veto the general form of resolution." 117
For similar reasons, such devices as party identification, closed
primaries, and centralized party conventions, 118 as well as some restrictions on access to decisionmaking and bargaining in Congress and
executive agencies, 119 are thought to serve as a means of avoiding or
delaying resolution of some issues by keeping them out of public debate and the public "consciousness." 120 Indeed, the increasing use in
recent years of government commissions appointed by the President or
Congress to decide major issues of policy, such as the deficit, social
security, or the future of the MX missile, represents an attempt to recreate outside the public eye the informal bargaining mechanism
116. The narrowness of decisionmaking within a pluralist framework has been frequently
criticized when used as a general model for government decisionmaking. At best, avoidance is
only an intermediate, not a universal, goal.
117. Orren, supra note 112, at 5.
I 18. See N. POLSBY, CONSEQUENCES OF PARTY REFORM (1983); D. PRICE, supra note 78;
L. SABATO, supra note 1I.
119. See s. FRANTZICH, COMPUTERS JN CONGRESS 246-47 (1982) ("With better information, members of Congress [are] able to determine not only the aggregate impact of legislation,
but also the specific impact on their districts, ... heighten[ing] the 'zero sum game' view of
politics" and "exacerbat[ing] the problem [of decisionmaking] by laying bare the conflicts over
values or parochial interests that were muted when such information was not readily available.");
Strauss, supra note 48, at 666 (critizing formalization of Presidential direction over agencies
because the visibility of this process might lead Congress to "encumber" the system "in ways
restricting the effectiveness of the President's coordinative apparatus."). Similar observations
have been made in game theory about the benefits of a "focal point," which avoids bargaining
over coordination problems. See A. ROTH, AXIOMATIC MODELS OF BARGAINING (1979); T.
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 70 (1963). For a discussion of the related agenda
control benefits of political parties, and their value in creating single-peaked preferences, see
supra note 86.
120. Nor is this technique foreign to courts. In constitutional law, for example, courts on
· occasion have left unclear the relative powers of the separate branches in part to facilitate such
informal compromises between the branches on a case-by-case basis. See Shane, Legal Disagree-

ment and Negotiation in a Government of Laws: The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against
Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461, 501 (1987). An example of this is the doctrine of executive
privilege. Id.
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among branches that existed with the parties. 121 While all of these are
only half-way time-limited measures (complete preclusion would b~
quite dangerous) the limits on information in these cases can facilitate
useful agreement and subsequent action. 122
2.

Civic Virtue and Law-and-Economics Attempts
To Further Precision

From a civic virtue perspective, this approach may seem perverse
- and certainly it is if carried too far. The foundation of rational
dialogue, indeed the normative defense often advanced for the legitimacy of the legal process itself, is the willingness of decisionmakers to
respond to and deal with challenges. 123 A variety of reforms consistent with the civic virtue perspective, such as the "hard look" doctrine ,
and "proliferation of points of access," are supposed to confront issues
and to "promote access to sources of public deliberation." 124 Similarly, law-and-economics proposals to facilitate greater consistency,
candor, and oversight through judicial review and statutory construe121. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. §§ 351-61 (1988) (establishing the Commission on Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Salaries); Executive Order No. 12400, 3 C.F.R. 147 (1983) (executive order
establishing the presidential Commission on Strategic Forces); 10 U.S.C.A. § 2687 (West Supp.
1989) (authorizing the defense secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101Stat1330 (1987) (codified at
2 U.S.C.A. § 901 (West Supp. 1989)) (establishing the National Economic Commission); Executive Order No. 12335, 3 C.F.R. 217 (1981) (executive order establishing the National Commission on Social Security Reform). See generally Greenberg & Flick, The New Bipartisan
Commissions, 1983 J. COMP. STUD. 3, 19. Indeed, the failure of the National Economic Commission to reach an agreement, in contrast to the success of the social security and base-closing
commissions, was attributed to the fact that it was subject to an open-meeting requirement. See,
e.g., MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour (Mar. 1, 1989) (comments of Rep. Frenzel).
The literature criticizing the "plebiscitary" presidency is based in part on a similar analysis: a
president whose every act is subject to media attention lacks the ability to facilitate compromise
and prioritize interests in the resolution of issues. See T. Low1, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT 13475 (1985); J. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 173-204 (1987). Of course, presidential or
congressional commissions can offer another analogous advantage: by lowering the number of
actors who participate in decisionmaking, they centralize power and help overcome collective
action problems.
122. At the same time, of course, incrementalist decisionmaking can be viewed as creating
information - that is, information about the results of marginal acts, which then can become the
basis of subsequent decisions. See Diver, supra note 74.
123. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
124. Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1577; see also id. at 1562 (discussing the "central republican
understanding that disagreement can be a creative force"); id. at 1581, 1584 (stating that statutory construction should promote "consistency," "coordination," "political accountability," and
"high visibil[ity]"); Bruff, supra note 28, at 238 ("[H]ard look review could play the same legitimizing role in administrative law that the jurisprudential school of 'reasoned elaboration' once
held out for the courts themselves through norms of neutral, consistent, and candid decisional
processes."); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 134 (1980) (criticizing legislators' "propensity
not to make politically controversial decisions - to leave them instead to others, most often
others who are not elected or effectively controlled by those who are"); cf Stewart, supra note 46,
at 1695 ("Individual politicians often find far more to be lost than gained in taking a readily
identifiable stand on a controversial issue of social or economic policy.").
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tion (that is, to further a legal and political cost-benefit analysis) are
intended to force the public and decisionmakers to deal openly with
problems. 125 As a practical matter, political candidates and parties are
routinely castigated in the popular press for not offering the details of
their programs or downplaying internal divisions. The presumption is
that such obfuscation undermines the electoral connection, namely,
the responsiveness of political representatives to the instrumental
needs and desires of their constituents, and prevents the development
of an effective rational dialogue. 126
In support of the view that greater information will not cause stalemate, civic virtue scholars suggest that an ideological normative discussion should promote a convergence of views on social principles.
That is because justifications must be proffered in terms of general normative ideals and not narrow utilitarian benefit. Where decisionmakers are less focused on their own personal utilitarian
advantage, it is supposed, they will be more likely to converge on first
principles, which are presumed to be consensual. If that is true, it
would seem unnecessary to reduce dialogue and information in the
way suggested above, since ideological confrontation on issues should
ultimately lead to a rough consensus. 127
Whatever the attraction of this perspective in an ideal world, 128 the
party approach .suggests that an ideological debate in a real-world
political environment, where people are aware of their self-interests
125. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 25, at 354 (urging the courts to review legislation for
"consistency" between ends and means in order "to increase the accountability of the legislature
to the voting public and to improve deliberation within Congress"); Macey, supra note 41, at 251
(calling for system of statutory construction to promote candor and "public regarding goals").
126. According to the textual analysis, if candidates and parties were forced to be open and
clearer, the responsiveness of our government, as measured by its utilitarian performance, would
be enhanced. For discussion of the other reasons offered for ambiguity, see generally Campbell,
Ambiguity in the Issue Positions of Presidential Candidates: A Causal Analysis, 27 AM. J. PoL.
Ser. 284 (1983); Shepsle, The Strategy ofAmbiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition, 66
AM. POL. Ser. REV. 555 (1972).
127. See Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1550 ("The requirement of deliberation embodies substantive limitations that in some settings lead to uniquely correct outcomes."); id. ("The requirement of deliberation is designed to ensure that political outcomes will be supported by reference
to a consensus (or at least broad agreement) among political equals."); id. at 1554 ("[R]epublican
approaches posit the existence of a common good, to be found at the conclusion of a welt-functioning deliberative process."); Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, supra note 49, at 24
(While "[m]y reading of the history will not show the standard version mistaken in its ascriptions
to republicanism of either the objectivism of public good or the teleology of civic virtue[,] I wish
rather to suggest why the civic ideal retains its hold despite its insults to modern sensibilities.").
128. Civic virtue writers have recognized the tensions within an objective view of morality.
See, e.g., Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, supra note 49, at 24 ("[T]he civic ideal retains
its hold despite its insults to modern liberal sensibilities."). See generally C. BAKER, supra note
10, at 22 ("Our limited rationality and the absence of objective truth undermine[] any basis for
confidence that the marketplace w[ill] lead to wisdom."); F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 34 (1982).
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and their ideologies differ, can often exacerbate divisions and undermine the ability to reach a consensus. There are two related reasons.
First, as a general matter, ideological politics tends to raise the stakes
of the debate because it requires a consistency in judgment that necessarily precludes everybody from getting "some but never all of what
[they] want."I 29 Compromise on the issue at hand can thus be more
difficult. Second, this effect is important not only for the resolution of
the question at issue, but also for other issues. By definition, when
issues are resolved ideologically, a decision about one issue can effectively decide a host of other issues because it is logically connected by
the ideology. I30 As a result, the stakes of the discussion in an ideological debate are higher because more potential interests are affected. 131
For both of these reasons, the political party literature suggests that
the value in confronting all issues must be balanced against the mediation and consensus-forming benefits of coalitional politics, which in
effect keep us unfocused on the long-term or "logical" implications of
our actions. Political parties and centralizing structures such as party
identification "represent[ ] the triumph of pragmatic compromise over
ideological purity that is an essential feature of American politics." 132
129. A. RANNEY & W. KENDALL, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM 508
(1956) (emphasis omitted). Problems over budget negotiations illustrate the tension. After passage of the 1974 Budget Control Act, each budget item was to be reevaluated in a classic comprehensive approach. See A. SCHICK, RECONCILIATION AND THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
PROCESS 34 (1981). It was no longer "possible to swap an increase here for a decrease there or
for an increase elsewhere without always having to consider the ultimate desirability of programs
blatantly in competition." A. WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS, supra
note 115, at 136-37.
130. See Miller, supra note 31, at 740 (noting that ideological politics ordinarily "entails a
large set of universal losers likely to be deeply alienated by the political system").
131. Curiously, this analysis is the exact opposite of the familiar refrain that ideological debate is the worst and most virulent because there is nothing at issue. Indeed, there is something
at issue, but it is something that allows of no compromise - right and wrong, truth or justice,
the structure of the society - and, therefore, can be more significant.
This argument, it should be pointed out, is consistent with the veil-of-ignorance discussion
explored in the next section, which examines the potential value of ideological discussions that
occur behind a veil of ignorance or a true real-world substitute. If decisions are delegated to
administrative agency personnel whose constant turnover complicates any prediction .as to their
future decisions, or are embodied in constitutional amendments where future application by
courts are truly unclear, winners and losers may be less apparent, even though the discussion has
major social significance and is truly ideological. Consensus might be possible. See infra notes
172-77 and accompanying text. In a real-world political debate that is not subject to a "veil,"
however, the impact of ideologies on other contexts and interests is more obvious. If political
institutions require that discussion be both comprehensive and rational, political agreement as a
general matter may be less achievable.
132. Orren, supra note 112, at 27. Indeed, it may be the case that imprecision, as advocated
in the literatures on pluralist incrementalism and nonideological parties, should be recognized as
a real-world means of promoting a civic virtue dialogue as well. On a fundamental level, the goal
of dialogue, indeed its very justification, is to reach some degree of certainty. A system that
converges on such truths, however, will extinguish any need or incentive for continued dialogue.
For this reason, institutions that promote uncertainty and imprecision can be viewed as ensuring
a continued institutional dialogue; common law decisionmaking and interest group pluralism, the
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The Decline of Party Identification: A Case Study in the
Instrumental and Utilitarian Problems with Increasing
Information

The utilitarian and instrumental benefits of limited information,
discussed above in terms of the political party model, find some factual
support in the problems associated with the decline of party identification and party strength over the past thirty years. As numerous scholars have detailed, party identification within the electorate and party
strength more generally have diminished, especially since the 1950s,
with a majority of the voters now identifying themselves as either independents or only loosely affiliated with a party. 133 This decline is
especially noteworthy given the fact that the United States, with its
dispersed political structure, has never had particularly strong parties,
two greatest "antagonists" of civic virtue, are perhaps the clearest examples. See E. LEVI, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948); see also supra note 93. The incremental institutional decisionmaking intrinsic to pluralist processes, and to a lesser extent nonideological parties, focuses clearly on immediate problems and, at the same time, ensures a continued exchange
of views and dialogue over time.
In the end, this paradox illustrates the fundamental tension within civic virtue writing itself
about dialogue and objective truth, that is, between objective and community truths. The work
of Michael Walzer is a good example. See M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983). For a
recent legal discussion of some aspects of this tension, see Kahn, supra note 86; Post, supra note
63. Put simply, if there are in fact correct answers, why need institutions for the dialogue be
eternal? Pluralism and nonideological parties seek to resolve this conflict in a particularly
noncivic-republican manner. Limitations on information and dialogue, under this approach,
serve as systems for institutionalizing a continuing discussion.
133. See w. CROTIY, AMERICAN PARTIES IN DECLINE (1984); N. NIE, s. VERBA & J.
PETROCIK, THE CHANGING AMERICAN VOTER (1979); M. WATTENBERG, supra note 78. Indeed, one political scientist has gone as far as to say:
In a world in which political scientists disagree on almost everything, there is remarkable
agreement among the political science profession ... that the strength of American political
parties has declined significantly over the past several decades. Regardless of how one measures partisanship - by personal party identification within the electorate, by party discipline in Congress, or by the vitality of party machinery - there is massive evidence attesting
to the weakened condition of the parties in the United States.
Orren, supra note 112, at 31.
There is evidence in recent years, however, of an increase in party fundraising, as well as
party voting and strength in Congress, especially on procedural issues. It is a subject of intense
debate whether or in what sense this represents a resurgence of party influence. See, e.g., Schlesinger, The New American Political Party, 19 AM. PoL. Sci. REV. 1152 (1985). Without doubt,
however, the focus of parties has become more national, as state party organizations have declined more precipitously. Id. In a forthcoming book, Gary Cox and Mathew Mccubbins argue
that the decline-of-party thesis is especially overstated in the case of Congress. See G. Cox & M.
MCCUBBINS, PARTIES AND COMMITTEES IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Nov.
1989 draft on file with the author). Regardless of whether one accepts their ultimate conclusions,
their thesi_s is predicated on the continuing viability of party identification in the electorate and
the resulting interest of individual congressmen in a small collective body such as Congress in
supporting party centralization in Congress and party efforts. While they appear to be more
optimistic than some other political scientists on the continuing strength of party identification,
their explanation of its overall impact appears to be consistent with the thesis of this article. For
a historical' and institutional explanation for the recent rise in party voting in Congress at the
same time as party influence has declined nationally, see B. GINSBURG & M. SHEFTER, POLITICS
BY OTHER MEANS: THE DECLINING IMPORTANCE OF ELECTIONS JN AMERICA 94-100 (1990).
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especially at the national level, as compared to some foreign countries
such as Great Britain.
While exceedingly complicated, the reasons for the drop lie partly
in the proliferation of political resources that has made possible the
dissemination of information independent of the parties. In particular,
individual members of Congress have an improved ability to communicate directly with the public because of increased opportunities for
individual candidate financing and PAC support; 134 increases in distributive legislation in the post-New Deal state; 135 constituency servicing; 136 greater popular education that has made examination of
individual differences among candidates more appealing; 137 and, perhaps most important, heightened media attention toward individual
candidates. 138 In addition, on the state level, the disaggregation of
political offices, whereby individual positions are elected at off-years,
minimizes the dependence of individual candidates on party or group
performance or assistance. 139 In this environment, individual politicians - especially incumbents - are better able than in the past to
distinguish themselves from their party by emphasizing single issues,
personality, and symbolic stands. In general, "the media have supplanted political parties as the main connecting rods between candidates and voters, providing citizens with their only real information
during the campaign." 140 As Morris Fiorina puts it, "Candidates
would have little incentive to operate campaigns independent of the
parties if there were no means to apprise the citizenry of their independence. The media provide the means." 141 In this situation we have a
134. See L. SABATO, PAC POWER (1985).
135. See M. FIORINA, supra note 30, at 37-47.
136. See id.
137. E. LADD & C. HADLEY, TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM 15-16
(1975).
138. See A. WARE, THE BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC PARTY ORGANIZATION, 19401980, at 241 (1985) (noting that critical to the breakdown of parties was "the development of new
technologies which could be employed in political campaigning, and the resources which helped
incumbents, especially legislators, to divorce themselves from the nominating and electoral activities of their party's organizations"); Richardson, supra note 78, at 700 (concluding that greater
party influence in Japan as compared to the United States is due to the fact that in Japan, unlike
the United States, the electorate is exposed regularly to information about parties but only intermittently to information about candidates). See generally J. CLUBB, W. FLANIGAN & N. ZINGALE, supra note 89, at 278-86 (decline of party identification and strength occurred when "[t]he
national information flow increased, became more varied and pervasive . . . , strain[ing] the
parties as mechanisms of political mobilization, [] integration, and policy formation").
139. W. BURNHAM, supra note 92, at 94.
140. Orren, supra note 112, at 31.
141. Fiorina, The Decline of Collective Responsibility in American Politics, 109 DAEDALUS,
Summer 1980, at 25, 33; see Orren, Thinking about the Press and Government, in IMPACT: How
THE PRESS AFFECTS FEDERAL POLICYMAKING 10 (M. Linsky ed. 1986) (quoting James Barber
as saying: "The media in the United States are the new political parties. The old political parties
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more dispersed dialogue.
To some extent, this phenomenon suggests that "the candidate, the
issue, [and] the particular events of the immediate campaign" may
count more now than in the past. Obviously, in certain respects this is
a political benefit. As two authors put it:
[I]n the contemporary environment of weak partisan loyalties and large
numbers of independents, the potential of the campaign for shaping
voter perceptions of the candidates may be higher than it has ever been.
As long-term voter commitments to [a] party becomes less important,
short-term impressions come to predominate.142

There is a trade-off, however, in terms of the three benefits of party
identification and strength described above. Most importantly:
[S]uch patterns [do not] represent an increase in voter rationality. "Candidate appeal" is often based on the most superficial, contrived kind of
media image. "Major issues" are too often a few isolated, symbolically
potent issues that happen to be "hot" at the moment - frequently as a
result of skilled advertising. And incumbent voting has loosened the
link, not only between the issue positions of individual voters and their
representatives, but also between national public opinion trends and
Congress as a whole.143

The resulting behavior is often "less political in a broad, programmatic sense than the reliance on party loyalties and identifications that
it replaces." 144 •
are gone."); M. WATIENBURG, supra note 78, at 100 ("Through the media, congressional candidates now have the capability of making themselves far more visible than in the past, and to the
degree that their campaigns are run independently of party one would expect a decline in the
saliency and intensity of partisan attitudes in the electorate.").
142. See F. SAUROF & P. BECK, supra note 79, at 295.
143. D. PRICE, supra note 78, at 110. As Saurof and Beck point out:
Recent campaigns have witnessed tremendous swings in public support for candidates right
up to election day and an increase in the effectiveness of personal attacks by opponents and
single-issue groups through negative television advertising, both signs of an electorate that
lacks deep-seated commitments to candidates or to parties.
F. SAUROF & P. BECK, supra note 79, at 296 (footnote omitted).
144. F. SAUROF & P. BECK, supra note 79, at 488; see also Fiorina, supra note 141, at 44 (this
"system . . . articulates interests superbly but aggregates them poorly"); Martin Wattenberg
suggests:
The party symbol performs a crucial linkage in the representation process because the "constituency can infer the candidates' position with more than random accuracy even though
what the constituency has learned directly about these stands is almost nothing." With
parties becoming increasingly less likely to perform this linkage and without voter knowledge of congressional candidates' positions, the chances for faithful representation are
clearly reduced.
M. WATIENBERG, supra note 78, at 112 (footnote omitted) (quoting Miller & Stokes, Constituency Influence in Congress, in ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICAL ORDER 371 (A. Campbell ed.
1966)).
This process may affect the presidency as well. In the past, when presidents were chosen by
party leaders and relied on party support and political identification for the election, the vote for
the president was more often a decision on parties than on individual candidates. Today, in
contrast, with independent primaries and independent candidate campaign organizations, the
selection of the president is based less on party evaluations and more on public assessments of the
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This confusion can have an effect on political participation as well.
Unable to rely on the simplicity of political parties, the public, especially the poor and less educated, often appears to care less about politics that it does not understand. 145 This has been accompanied by an
unprecedented decline in voter turnouts, which can be attributed in
part to the drop in party identification. 146
Beyond these instrumental problems, moreover, some believe there
is evidence of a utilitarian cost, both in the increased dominance of
special interest groups, and the heightened ideological divisions and
stalemate that have been associated with the absence of strong parties.
With the drop in party identification and party influence generally,
many members of Congress seem to have found it easier, all things
being equal, to build an independent constituency through pork barrel
projects and constituent servicing. The result, as political scientists
character and personality of individual candidates. The result may be what several political
scientists call a "personal president" or a "rhetorical president," who is more subject to immediate public pressures and assessment. This may also mean a decline in the traditional principaV
agency relationship between populace and president, and, according to some prominent scholars,
in the likelihood of institutional effectiveness. See T. Low1, supra note 121; J. Tuus, supra note
121; see also supra note 87 (discussing political advantages of a principaVagency relationship). A
somewhat analogous concern regarding the dwarfing of "soft" or "complex" variables underlies
the anxiety over too searching judical review of agency decisionmaking. See, e.g., Strauss, Considering Political Alternatives to Hard Look, 1989 DUKE L.J. 538, 549-50.
145. Michael McGerr describes how old-style party identification helped overcome the collective action problem:
A man's decision to vote at a particular election did not depend solely on the allure of a
candidate, the interest of an issue, or the closeness "on election; instead, his vote became a
testament, regularly given, to his persisting identification with one of the parties.
M. McGERR, supra note 81, at 41; see also Burnham, supra note 32, at 132 ("[T]he relative
disappearance of partisan terms in campaigns and their replacement by personalistic and imagistic appeals to voters create conditions that make utility calculations difficult, if not impossible,
[with the result that] some people will remain far better positioned to make accurate utility
calculations than others."); R. ENTMAN, supra note 84, at 137 ("The decline of participation in
the U.S. has historically paralleled the dwindling of the partisan press and the rise of objectivity."); Abramson & Aldrich, The Decline ofElectoral Participation in America, 76 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 502 (1982). This is not to argue that all historically excluded groups are necessarily disadvantaged by this decline. As noted above, some politicians (Jesse Jackson, for example), have
certainly been quite successful in opening up political structures in particular cases.
146. Walter Burnham summarized this connection:
Inchoate politics, fragmented electoral choices, and personalistic campaign images lead naturally to growth in the number of citizens who have a low sense of their external political
efficacy; more citizens who find it difficult or impossible to make a utility calculation different from zero (or perhaps make one at all); and general erosion of the strength of party
identification. As politicians' incentives at elections shift more and more to considerations
of "every person for himself," the notion of collective will tends to disappear; and so, in a
highly selective way, does the active electorate.
Burnham, supra note 32, at 123-24 (footnote omitted).
In earlier days, party identification served to filter out many of these individualistic considerations, and highlighted the relationship of the candidate to general political and social interests
that are often obscured by expanded and diverse political debate. As David Price observed:
"The idea of 'voting for the person and not the party' fits nicely with the individualistic and
moralistic strain of American political culture, but neither the virtue nor the rationality of such a
stance will bear careful scrutiny." D. PRICE, supra note 78, at 110.
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have shown, is an environment more conducive to the political universalism described above. 147 At the same time, greater ideological orientation in Congress appears to have led at times to greater stalemate as
well.148

E. Political Party and Other Reforms as an Attempt
To Channel Information
Despite the benefits of strong parties, party identification, and
more limited information, it is probably neither possible nor advisable
to create a strong party system in the form experienced at various
times in our history, 149 or in some other countries. For one, resources
that were valuable historically in the United States in sustaining
stronger parties - notably, extensive graft and patronage - are no
longer politically or constitutionally available. 150 In addition, the increased dialogue and diverse participation accompanying the decline
of parties have probably provided benefits, especially among previously dispossessed groups, such as blacks, in both substantive influence and participation. 151 Finally, while less information may have
offered advantages in a pre-technological age when ignorance did not
depend upon active government suppression of information, it would
be dangerous to attempt to reconstruct that state today, given the potential for tyrannical governmental overreaching.
In light of the instrumental benefits of more limited information
described above, however, there are reforms that may be useful methods for channeling information away from narrow constituencies and
toward centralized institutions. They would not, and given our political structure probably could not, create truly strong parties. Rather,
these proposals would, as some have recommended, simply "restrict[ ]
access to resources and opportunities that would allow legislat[ors and
other politicians] to build strong personal ties to their constituen[ts]."152 In other words, they would seek to decrease the salience and recognition of narrow group activities - in effect erecting a
147. See Fitts, Vices of Virtue, supra note 11, at 1628-31 (summarizing the history of this
phenomenon).
148. Id.
149. For an excellent description of politics during the late 1800s and early 1900s, see M.
McGERR, supra note 81.
150. See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (prohibiting dismissal of certain govern·
ment employees based on party allegiance); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (holding that the
practice of patronage dismissals violates the first and fourteenth amendments).
151. See Ackerman, supra note 28, at 744-46; see also supra notes 61-65 and accompanying
text.
152. B. CAINE, J. FEREJOHN & M. FIORINA, supra note 105, al 14.
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veil of ignorance around them - while, in some cases, also accentuating the activities of more centralized political units. In a sense, they
represent modem-day attempts to reintroduce some modest reductions in information. When they are justified depends to a large extent
on how factually significant the effects outlined above tum out to be in
individual cases.
1.

Coattail Effects

One example is the proposal to move the election of members of
Congress to several weeks after the presidential election. 153 The purpose of this change is to increase the salience of that election, that is,
its "coattail effects," in much the same way that party identification in
the earlier days overwhelmed the peculiarities of local candidates. By
linking the presidential and congressional candidates of the same party
in a web of interconnecting interest, the party label would be emphasized and the party strengthened. The result would be a decreased
focus on individual candidate behavior and an increased focus on
group responsibility. Proposals to move state elections from off-years
to coincide with federal elections have similar purposes in terms of
strengthening national parties.154
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, other proposals seek to
minimize the independent voice of individual candidates. These include attempts to decrease the financial resources and influence of individual candidates by, for example, reducing their franking privileges;
placing limits on PAC contributions and ending open primaries; improving the financial and other resources of parties, including their
patronage; and ending the limits on outside contributions to parties. 155
153. See J. SUNDQUIST, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 93-98
(1986); Cutler, Party Government Under the American Constitution, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 25, 38
(1985).
.
154. See J. SUNDQUIST, supra note 153, at 95-98; Sundquist, Needed: A Political Theory for
the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States, 103 POL Sci. Q. 613, 631 (1988);
Cutler, supra note 153, at 38; F. SAUROF & P. BECK, supra note 79, at 278 n.8. Of course, to the
extent that one views divided government as a result of an intentional decision of the voting
public, cf Fiorina, supra note 85, this change would have less impact.
155. Morris Fiorina has considered a prohibition on contributions to individual candidates.
See Fiorina, supra note 141, at 45 n.30 ("party cohesion would no doubt be strengthened by
revising existing statutes to prevent ticket splitting voting and to permit campaign contributions
only to parties"). Other proposals do not go so far, though their objective is the same. See
Sabato, Real and Imagined Corruption in Campaign Financing, in ELECTIONS AMERICAN
STYLE, supra note 32, at 168 ("The long-term objective is clear: beef up the parties so that P ACs
[and individual candidates) will be limited indirectly."). Pursuing similar objectives, others have
called for direct public subsidization of a party media. See R. ENTMAN, supra note 84, at 136-37
(defending proposal on grounds that "[t]he decline of participation in the U.S. has historically
paralleled the dwindling of the partisan press and the rise of objectivity; perhaps an injection of
party media would reverse the trend").
Of course, civic virtue proponents have called for limitations on PACs, but ordinarily on
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In order for these proposals to have a significant impact, constitutional
impediments to some of these limitations might need to be relaxed. 156
2.

Government Secrecy

Several other changes might serve to reduce the informational advantages of special interest groups, as well as to facilitate compromise,
by creating occasional exceptions to the general trend toward greater
sunshine legislation. Decisionmakers might consider, for example,
making the floor votes of individual members of Congress secret in
some cases (though not the aggregate tally); closing more congressional meetings to the public; and closing more administrative agency
operations to public view, including ending ex parte contacts. 157 Any
restriction on initial public access, though, would need to be accompanied by increased presidential and party involvement; the change
would be acceptable only if there were greater central political participation and therefore political accountability for the resulting
decisions.
Although this is not the place to attempt to delineate any particular cases, some contexts, such as the establishment of overall budget
levels in the legislative branch, transmission of agency budgets to Congress by executive agencies, and generation of the executive branch
regulatory agenda, seem to be fruitful cases for study. Indeed, some
recent budgetary and regulatory reforms have moved in this direction,
sometimes with the approval of civic virtue adherents. 158 If successful,
the public would focus less on the marginal advantage of specific decisions or actions taken by their individual representatives, and would
concern itself instead with the overall party product. At the same
time, more central political actors, such as high executive officials and
party leaders, would need to be forced by law to participate more visibly, making them more responsible to the public for the outcome.
Certainly, there are important trade-offs and dangers implicit in
any attempts to limit information, especially if they are applied to the
redistributive grounds. While I am sympathetic to those reasons, that is not the rationale I am
advancing here.
156. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (F.E.C. Act provisions limiting certain campaign contributions invalidated under first amendment).
157. See S. FRANTZICH, supra note 119, at 238-39 ("[W]ith more recorded votes, members of
Congress are on display and can ill afford to be known as people who forsake constituent concerns in the pursuit of party loyalty,'' resulting in "reduced .•. power of the leadership.");
Greenberg & Flick, supra note 121, at 19-20 (arguing that stalemate and the enhanced influence
of narrow constituencies in Congress is due to breakdown of the parties and to enhanced public
scrutiny).
158. See Sunstein, supra note 50, at 452-63.
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adjudicative context. 159 No one is calling for a return to secrecy in
government, only greater sensitivity to the political costs of total and
immediate disclosure. While any change would need to be carefully
identified so as to not undermine other dialogic and participation values, there appear to be specific cases where limiting political information may achieve public benefits.160
3.

Government Commissions

In light of this analysis, the value and problems of presidential
commissions with less clear institutional accountability can also be
better understood. Over the past few years, there have been numerous
attempts to erect blue ribbon, high-visibility boards to resolve divisive
budgetary and political issues such as the deficit, social security, or the
closing of military bases. 161 In these instances, Congress and the President have delegated decisionmaking on specific issues to independent
commissions with broad mandates to come up with "solutions" for
particular problems. While in some cases boards are given final decisionmaking authority, plans are usually submitted to Congress for approval. Obviously, since the original plans could have been considered
by Congress without commission review, the rationale for the establishment of commissions, apart from some special expertise of their
members, appears to be to bind Congress and the general public morally and politically to the resulting solution.
A large part of the appeal of this device is its informational insulation. Ideally, the commission may serve, much like traditional party
identification, to help insulate representatives from constituent and
special interest group pressures, erecting a veil over the process of
decisionmaking and giving the commission's resulting proposal a public interest veneer once it is introduced back into Congress. 162 In addi159. In some cases, special interest groups may have better knowledge of what is occurring
behind closed doors, so this veil would have the effect of increasing their informational advantage
over the public. Moreover, there is a constant concern about the potential for tyranny. As I
have suggested previously, however, it is not clear whether stronger centralized power in a twoparty sense may not reduce the possibility of tyranny. See Fitts, Vices of Virtue, supra note 11, at
1610-12.
160. This argument is discussed again below. See infra notes 217-26 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 121.
162. See Greenberg & Flick, supra note 121, at 19 ("Opening up" of congressional process so
that representatives are no longer insulated from interest group pressure by party strength has
"so complicated and burdened the legislative bargaining process that recourse to commissions
... [becomes] almost inevitable."). Unlike the traditional New Deal agency, moreover, which
over time has established strong links to congressional oversight committees and to special interest groups concerned with its activities, the high-level commissions can be more insulated from
such input. Thus, they can be less likely to suffer from the traditional problem of special interest
groups being advantaged by a partial veil. See infra notes 163 and 207-11 and accompanying
text.

964

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 88:917

tion, and equally important, the commission permits bargaining
outside the formal spotlight of existing legal institutions, hopefully facilitating consensus. While there are obvious problems with this technique, especially if the commission takes the form of the traditional
New Deal agency where no single central figure ultimately assumes
responsibility for its decisions, 163 it has served as a modem-day substitute for the parties on some issues where it is limited in time and subject matter and has overall high public visibility for its finished
product.
4. Increasing Voting Turnout
Finally, recent attempts to deal with declining voter turnout by
withholding information about election returns and polls can be valuable for somewhat similar reasons. Voting creates the same type of
prisoners' dilemma as do special interest groups. 'If the public votes
only for narrow instrumental reasons, individual citizens should not
make an effort to vote, since their vote has almost no likelihood of
affecting the outcome. 164 Unfortunately, to the extent that everybody
fails to vote, this understanding undermines all of our interests by ending or perverting the electoral connection.
Yet the vote has not always been perceived in as cynical a way.
Party identification originally helped to fill this void. Part of the reason individuals voted was that they ignored the distinction between
individual and group (collective) action, believing in the party as almost a mythical symbol. Voting was a group, not an individual, activity. Thus, just as party identification is a symbol that leads individuals
to pursue group interests and may minimize the prisoners' dilemma of
special interest government, so the general myths of party identification can lead individuals to ignore their narrow self-interest on the
decision of whether to vote at all. 165 Quite simply, our ignorance of
163. See e.g.• M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 172
(1955). Thus, in the case of permanent low-level commissions the insulation may serve' to exacerbate the influence of specialized constituencies. See McEachern, Federal Advisory Commissions
in an Economic Model of Representative Democracy, 54 PUB. CHOICE 41 (1987); Petracca, Federal Advisory Committees, Interest Groups and the Administrative State, 13 CONG. & PRES. 83
(1976). In addition, it also should be recognized that some aspects of the veil often appear to be
more apparent than real. When the proposals on legislative and judicial salaries were ultimately
submitted back to Congress, for example, individual members of Congress were clearly held
accountable for their decisions, and the increase was defeated. For a discussion of the separation-of-powers aspects of such commissions, and their potential value in furthering a veil of ignorance and political consensus, see infra note 211.
164. See N. FROHLICH & J. OPPENHEIMER, MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY 97-107 (1978);
R. HARDIN, supra note 14, at l l; Meehl, The Selfish Voter Paradox and the Thrown-Away Vote
Argument, 71 AM. POL. SCI. REV. l l (1977).
165. See M. McGERR, supra note 81, at 39-41.
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and failure to focus on the "logic of collective action" can help to save
us from the perverse consequences of collective action. 166
In light of this historical benefit of ignorance, and of the continuing
decline in voting in recent years, 16 7 there are various changes that can
best be understood as seeking to reinforce the ignorance of the collective implications of the voting decision. For example, the periodic effort to prohibit public opinion polls from being taken during the last
few weeks before elections, or to stop the networks from announcing
the election results in some states before the polls have closed in
others, are attempts to reinforce the ignorance of the collective implications of the voting decision. 168 These changes seek to divert the focus away from the individual's impact on group activity. The failure
to release this information is supposed to help maintain the belief that
your vote is important, even though it is virtually impossible in a presidential election that an individual vote will matter in any case, regardless of what the last polls or television returns show. While
incremental, these changes illustrate another possible value of limited
information.

F. Implications for Civic Virtue and Law-and-Economics Theory
The proposals discussed above are admittedly modest and precatory. My purpose is to sketch the outlines of some doctrinal and structural changes that appear to further the party approach, give a sense of
their direction, and underscore their potential tension with the civic
virtue and law-and-economics approaches.
As noted above, the civic virtue tradition seeks to structure government so as to "proliferate points of access" to legislative and administrative decisionmaking and to expand the dissemination of
information opportunities. 169 Law-and-economics proposals to facilitate disclosure of information can have similar effects.17° Taken individually and on an elite level, there are benefits to many of these
changes; they serve, for example, to illuminate the implicit biases of
166. See D. MUELLER, supra note 37, at 122-24 (finding that voter participation increases
with closeness of elections). There are also important participational and noninstrumental benefits to voting. See, e.g., Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 930, 950-53 (1988). Public behavior reflects this conclusion: much
of the public still votes, despite awareness of the collective action problem, partly because they
view the decision to vote noninstrumentally. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 87, at 893-94,
907.
167. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Blum, Polling an Attorney for Advice, Natl. L.J., Nov. 21, 1988, at 10.
169. See supra notes 49-66 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
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particular proposals and marginal costs. On a systemic political level,
however, there can be trade-offs, especially on the political and electoral system. A general public that finds it difficult to make sense of
complex dialogue and 'splintered government institutions may, at the
same time, find it increasingly difficult to understand, care about, or
participate in such a general political environment. Compromise and
agreement may also be more difficult. Political and legal institutions
should be designed to take account of both effects, which can be in
tension with one another.
The proposals outlined above are offered as exceptions to common
civic virtue or law-and-economics approaches, and serve to channel
information and public attention to more centralized institutions. In
particular, the bulk of the proposals to strengthen political parties seek
to decrease the independent financial or structural ability of entrepreneurial actors to engage in some forms of public dialogue and, in
some cases, to increase the influence of centralized institutions such as
the parties. In a sense, they change the matrix payoff of information,
moving it to support more centralized institutions. No one suggests
that any institution should be given the power to determine what information should be disclosed, that is, to limit it by prohibition; concerns
about tyranny and lack of diverse participation preclude that. 171 The
way political institutions are organized and the way financial resources
are deployed in these cases, however, can serve an intermediate role by
shaping the manner in which issues and programs are presented to the
public.
IV. LIMITED INFORMATION AS A NORMATIVE BENEFIT IN
DECISIONMAKING: VEILS OF IGNORANCE (MODEL IV)

Up to now I have focused on the three instrumental advantages to
more limited information - improved rationality, utilitarian efficiency, and political agreement. In this section, I turn to examine a
fourth model, a type of veil of ignorance which offers a normative advantage in decisionmaking. This benefit can be achieved in theory by
excising information about the effect of a decision on different groups,
thereby erecting something like a real-world veil of ignorance around
the consequences of social policy for individual groups' interests. If
successful, this may help promote a rational dialogue and forge a political consensus. 112
171. The first amendment generally and appropriately serves as a limitation on such
intervention.
172. In theory, the consequences for political decisionmaking of such limitations can be
three-fold. First, by eliminating self-interest, the veil can serve to stimulate a rational dialogue
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While the use of the often-mentioned but seldom-examined device
of a veil of ignorance is subject to some theoretical and practical
problems that will be developed below, I argue that it has been successful in one important structural public law case related directly to
the thesis of this article: party turnover within a government of separated powers. In other words, the veil has been promoted by a wellfunctioning two-party system. Conversely, it appears to have been undermined by changes advanced at different times in the law-and-economics and civic virtue literatures.
A. A Theory of the Veil of Ignorance
Establishing a true veil of ignorance in the real world is obviously a
difficult if not impossible task. In general, partial veils of ignorance
can be created in public decisionmaking through any technique that
serves to introduce a structural impediment to a clear identification of
the ultimate winners and losers in a public decision. While it is unnecessary to catalogue all of the specific cases, the most prominent is a
constitutional amendment. 173 In addition, statutes that are expected
which, to the extent that our society enjoys a dominant consensual ideology with respect to a
particular issue, helps to forge a consensus. Second, to the extent that the ideology is Rawlsian
or utilitarian, the limitations could create incentives for income redistribution. Finally, a limitation on information which is complete, that is, which serves effectively to avoid a particular issue,
may avoid destructive philosophical divisions on occasions where there are potentially unresolved philosophical as well as interest group differences. This last case was explored separately supra in section III.C, though there clearly are aspects of a real-world veil of ignorance
that promote consensus through this type of effect as well.
173. The traditional case where the legal system can impose a modified veil of ignorance is
through constitutional amendment under article V. When the populace at large is engaged in
constitutional decisionmaking, political actors are necessarily proceeding under some ignorance
or imprecision - due both to the implicit agreement that constitutional provisions must be
framed in very general terms and to their long-term prospective application. The combination
may make it less certain exactly how the provision will be applied as well as what position the
framers will be in when it is applied. Indeed, in some cases it may be the framers' descendants
who are most affected by the provision, rather than the framers themselves. As a result of this
combination of factors, it can be argued that constitutional decisionmaking, while it does have
other liabilities noted below, may make individuals more willing to consider such issues from a
public-regarding perspective. See, e.g., L. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution 26 (unpublished
manuscript presented at Legal Studies Seminar, University of Pennsylvania (Jan. 26, 1989), and
on file with author) ("Decisionmaking about a long-distance Constitution is a special kind of
venture, one which reinforces the tendency to generalize away from one's own present time and
circumstance to other times and circumstances; a venture, in other words, which encourages the
generality of the moral perspective."); J. BUCHANAN & J. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 78 (1962) ("uncertainty that is required in order for the individual to be led by his own
interest to support constitutional provisions that are generally advantageous to all individuals
and to all groups seems likely to be present at any constitutional stage of discussion"); Mueller,
Constitutional Democracy and Social Welfare, 87 Q.J. EcoN. 60, 61 (1973) (the drafters of a
constitutional amendment should consider the impact on all citizens and future generations); cf
Ackerman, supra note 92, at 1171-73 (population engages in high politics when considering the
Constitution); Elliot, Constitutional Conventions and the Deficit, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1106-07
(a constitutional convention would transcend politics as usual and frame the issues on a general
and abstract level).
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to remain in force for extended periods 174 and delegation of decisionmaking to administrative agencies 175 can create sufficient ambiguity
that the initial decisionmakers have difficulty in calculating the incidence of costs and benefits. In these cases, the veil can be furthered
largely by the generality of the rule that is initially adopted, making it
unclear exactly how it will be applied. 176 The vagueness can also be
created by ambiguity about who will enforce the rule or how they will
enforce it (turnover in control of administrative agencies in particular
affects both these factors), 177 and by the length of time it will be enforced (due to the length of time constitutional amendments and certain long-term statutes are in effect, the position of the proponents and
other groups may change dramatically).
174. The same analysis can be applied to authorizing legislation, or so-called back door
spending. To the extent that legislation is general and reasonably can be expected to remain on
the books for years to come, its longevity can have a similar type of effect on political motivation
as a constitutional amendment. The longer the legislation is likely to stay in effect, the more it
may impede the framers' calculation of self-interest. Of course, this argument is predicated on
there being greater difficulty in repealing legislation. See, e.g., McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast,

Strocture and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Control ofAgen·
cies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 435-40 (1989).
175. Delegation of decisionmaking to administrative agencies can, at least in theory, offer a
similar normative advantage. When legislation is framed in general terms, or substantive authority is specifically delegated to administrative agencies, the precise application of the provision by
the administrative agency is unclear largely because the personnel of the agency are constantly in
flux. Thus, there is ambiguity both as to the identity of the executive officials who are subject to
the provision and to the nature of the decisions they will make.
Needless to say, this is relevant to both those who might become executive officials and those
who will be subject to its structures. While law-and-economics scholars have explored delegation
as an efficiency-enhancing (or efficiency-reducing) device in the effective implementation of programs, delegation can also shape and transform the thinking of the initial decisionmakers in
Congress in much the same way as the requirement in administrative law that certain types of
decisions be made through rulemaking. See Diver, supra note 74.
176. See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 173, at 120; Bruff, supra note 28, at 221
("A check on the fairness of selecting decision rules is the difficulty in determining who will
profit from their later use in specific cases.... [A]t the operational stage it is much easier to
predict the winners and losers from a change in the decision rules."). To some extent, one might
argue that this technique creates consensus by avoidance, obscuring the existence or significance
of problems in order to forge agreement. In this sense, it is similar to the technique of avoiding
intractable debates through ignorance and avoidance, as described in section III.C. On the other
hand, at least as an ideal, the technique should only obscure the incidence of costs and benefits of
different policies, not the problems themselves.
177. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (the incompatibility clause); J. LOCKE, THE SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT§ 143 (J.W. Grough ed. 1966) (6th ed. 1764) ("[B]ecause it may be
too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at power, for the same persons, who have
the power of making laws, to have also in their hands the power to execute them, whereby they
may exempt themselves from the obedience to the laws they make, and suit the law, both in its
making and execution, to their own private advantage, and thereby come to have a distinct inter·
est from the rest of the community ...."); cf. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 449-50
(1965) (When establishing criminal liability, Congress must "set forth a generally applicable rule
•.. and leave to the courts and juries the job of deciding what persons have committed the
specified acts or possess the specified characteristics.").

Veils of Ignorance

April 1990)

B.

969

Criticisms of This Approach

As with all approaches to policymaking, however, the veil is subject to both philosophical and practical problems. These difficulties
are important in appreciating when and why it may not be a useful
technique.
1. Philosophical Critiques

As the philosophical criticisms of Rawls' veil of ignorance outlined
above suggest,1 78 an informationally restrictive veil may undermine
the richness of public dialogue by obscuring interests and issues. In
order to promote a rational dialogue, civic theory generally seeks to
expand the points of access to decisionmaking, thereby forcing government actors to talk to and understand others' viewpoints. Knowledge
of one's own position is critical to the clear presentation of one's
views. 179 In contrast, the theory behind a veil of ignorance appears to
reflect a more skeptical view of human motivation and of the ability to
encourage a true dialogue when knowledge of one's self-interest still
exists. Its value lies in cases where (and to the extent that) the
proliferation of information is likely to sharpen people's knowledge of
and willingness to pursue their self-interests.180
Law-and-economics scholars, on the other hand, may also be troubled by the loss of information, though on different grounds. Lawand-economics scholars explore the acquisition of information instrumentally; the question for them is ordinarily whether more expenditure on information would lead to utilitarian advantages for the
individual, or, considering externalities, for society in general. 181
Under this approach, efficiency concerns are ordinarily treated separately from redistributive concerns. 182 In this sense, for example, dele178. See M. SANDEL, supra note 54, at 122-32 (arguing one cannot know one's views or
interests unless one is situated in a particular context); supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
179. Ultimately, the value of this exchange depends on the participants' abilities to evince
empathy for other positions - a necessary predicate to the normative free dialogue that leads to
a consensus or agreement on the normative system. Obviously, one of the main difficulties with
this system is that it is subject to serious problems of deception and lack of empathy.
180. Usually, a veil of ignorance is not justified on the grounds that it may serve as a welfare
lottery. It does not improve decisionmaking or social welfare merely because people might enjoy
their ignorance of future social positions. Rather, it changes their decisionmaking process in
ways that should enhance (from an ethical perspective) the group social product, taking away the
decisionmakers' sense of their own interest·in particular outcomes of the decision. Thus, the
choice whether or not to retain such procedures is not ordinarily predicated on the risk aversion
of the general population or their decisionmakers. See Mashaw, supra note 48, at 88 {discussing
delegation in terms of risk aversion). Nevertheless, like Model III, it can serve that role.
181. See supra note 22 {discussing technical and philosophical problems with the veil-ofignorance approach).
182. This observation is intended as description, not criticism. Law-and-economics theory
ordinarily views redistributive issues as a separate analytic concern. See supra note 20 {discuss-
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gation is evaluated according to whether the division of labor
improves efficiency. 183 The purpose of the veil of ignorance, on the
other hand, is to create a social and political incentive for individuals
to be willing to redistribute resources or reach agreements. This is a
question of preference formation, which law-and- economics scholars
generally do not address. 184 It may well be that the veil will create
inefficiencies or deadweight losses. 185
2. Practical Problems

Apart from these philosophical differences, attempts to create a
real-world veil can raise serious practical problems. Because the techniques for creating a real-world veil lack the precision of Rawls' heuristic device, which by definition perfectly eliminated knowledge of the
decisionmakers' place in society, the veil can be either overinclusive or
underinclusive.
If it is overinclusive, and too much information is eliminated, ambiguity can create a misidentification of goals, obscure legitimate interests, and dwarf relevant problems. For example, the generality of
constitutional decisionmaking and legislative delegation has meant
that courts and independent agencies have often been accused of pursuing goals viewed as adverse to the Congress that originally passed
the measure. 186 The frequent criticism that New Deal agencies were
"captured" by special interest groups clearly falls into this category. 1s1
ing ideal types). See generally A.M. POLINSKY, supra note 21, at 7 ("Economists traditionally
concentrate on how to maximize the size of the pie, leaving to others - such as legislators - the
decision how to divide it."); id. at 10 ("For purposes of discussing the legal system, a reasonable
simplifying assumption is that income can be costlessly redistributed."); Rose-Ackerman, supra
note 25, at 342 (law and economics "takes wealth maximization as a first principle").
183. See Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 30, at 6, 27-30.
184. To be sure, the reaching of agreements can be viewed as an issue of efficiency in the
sense of avoiding the collective action costs of achieving consensus.
185. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 25, at 344 (stating that welfare economics "generally
lacks a realistic view of the working of the political process[,] ... ignoring political feasibility").
Indeed, one of the most important aspects of the veil - the difference principle - is inconsistent
with the approach of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. The point is simply that in some cases inefficiencies may be justified as the cost of creating the political incentive for redistribution or political
consensus.
186. Of course, on one level, the underlying purpose of the veil is to pursue goals adverse to
the inter!.!StS of some participants in the legislative arena. See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text. The problem is that an imperfect veil of constitutional decisionmaking can go beyond
this, obscuring resolution of certain problems and leaving it to the courts and agency bureaucrats
to fill in this vagueness by pursuing their own independent objectives. That certainly appears to
be one of the current "conservative" critiques of judicial and agency usurpation. See, e.g., J.
RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS (1989); M. SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS: JUDI·
CIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION (1988). An earlier "liberal" generation had similar
problems with the hold-over New Deal Court. See A. BICKEL, supra note 91, at 90.
187. See M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 163, at 86-87.
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On the other hand, if the veil is underinclusive, too little information may be excised, allowing some but not all political actors to pierce
the veil. For example, to the extent there is not turnover in the groups
to which a statutory or constitutional requirement applies and to the
extent its impact is clear, the extended length of time it is expected to
be in effect can exacerbate divisions and increase attempts at rent-seeking. This would occur, for example, as groups such as pro- or antiabortion advocates fight "to the death." Due to the clarity of the issue
and its long-term impact, they continue to battle rather than compromise.188 Similarly, to the extent that only a subgroup can foresee the
impact of a rule, as in the case of some delegations to administrative
agencies, the veil may increase social differences, as some advantaged
groups use it as a mechanism to appropriate social resources to
themselves. 189
These trade-offs can be seen in a variety of different public law
debates. For example, a great deal of academic paper has been consumed criticizing backdoor budget authority. In an attempt to promote instrumental rationality, many have criticized such budgeting on
the ground that it avoids yearly analysis of the costs of programs. In
addition, the use of different funding devices (backdoor versus ordinary appropriation statutes) can further fiscal illusion, according to
this line of reasoning, by hiding the true costs of programs. 190
Nevertheless, backdoor budget authority, as opposed to yearly appropriation statutes or other time-limited legislation, can provide a
normative advantage in some respects. An appropriation statute is
limited to one year only, and thus will generally have an impact only
for that limited time. Those voting for the particular item are more
likely to know precisely who will or will not benefit from the legislation. In contrast, an authorization bill, or a bill granting backdoor
budget authority, lasts in perpetuity, unless Congress can overcome
inertia and repeal it. In areas where Congress can expect to see a large
turnover in the groups or institutions that will be subject to the partic188. See, e.g.• J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LoST THE ERA 194 (1986) (defeat of ERA was a
result of "[t]rying to legislate a broad principle through the constitutional amendment process";•
"basic issues were at stake" and "the final result had to be victory for one side and defeat for the
other"); Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. &
ECON. 875, 879 (1975); Macey, supra note 25, at 52 (stating that according to law-and-economics
theorists "special interest groups place an especially high value on constitutional rules, because
such rules are harder to repeal and therefore more durable than ordinary legislation").
189. See infra notes 208-09 and accompanying text. For an effort to explain administrative
procedures in terms of assisting different groups in monitoring bureaucracies, see McCubbins,
Noll, & Weingast, supra note 36.
190. Cf Goetz, Fiscal Illusion in State and Local Finance, in BUDGETS AND BUREAUCRATS:
THE SOURCES OF GOVERNMENT GROWTH 176, 177 (T. Borcherding ed. 1977).
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ular restriction or statutory limitation, these bills may create some
greater incentive for Congress to reach a greater level of consensus and
equality. Such areas include limitations on the executive branch, rules
about the procedures of Congress, and overall levels of taxation. 191
The reason for this incentive is that more groups will potentially be
subject to the limitation.192
Indeed, this is the type of technique that Congress used to reach
agreement on budget cuts in the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Control Act of 1985, popularly known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings.193 By setting budget targets years ahead, the precise incidence
of budget reductions was less predictable to the Congress that originally passed the measure. In effect, ignorance about specific outcomes
can help forge a consensus and create a disincentive against the singular pursuit of narrow group advantage, at least ex ante. 194
A similar debate has occurred regarding the early law-and-economics argument, advanced originally by Landes and Posner, that the
long-term enforceability of statutes by independent courts facilitated
rent-seeking by ensuring that deals would continue to push benefits in
perpetuity to the narrow group which originally secured passage of the
legislation. 195 Under the early law-and-economics view, the longer the
statute's existence, the more likely it was to facilitate rent-seeking by
narrow groups, and to heighten political divisions. This is due to the
greater discounted benefit to their present political activity. To the
191. See infra section IV.C.1. As noted above, this argument is predicated on the greater
difficulty in repealing legislation. See supra note 174.
192. Another example can be found in the events surrounding the original passage of the
income tax during the Civil War. After Congress was unable to increase traditional property
taxes, the effects of which would have been perfectly clear, agreement was ultimately reached on
an income tax, largely because the effect of the then-novel tax on different constituencies was
unknown. See J. Alt, The Evolution of Tax Structures 36-50 (1982) (unpublished manuscript on
file with author).
193. Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-22 (1988)).
194. While such programs may be less "efficient" than lump-sum distributions, they can
create the political will to redistribute or reach agreements. For similar reasons, a variety of
internal legislative rules can be viewed as attempts to erect veils of ignorance over legislative
activity, helping to promote consensus. For example, the rules of procedure for each Congress
are set by the prior Congress and can be amended only through intervention, sometimes requiring super-majorities, at the beginning of that Congress. The system has been the subject of some
academic criticism on the grounds that each new Congress should generate independently, or at
least be able to repeal through majority vote, all of its rules each term. See Eule, Temporal
Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FoOND. RES.
J. 379, 407-12, 425 n.215. Because legislative procedure is ordinarily agreed upon at a time when
participants are less clear about the effect of the rules on their interests, however, they may be
less likely to consider marginal instrumental advantages and, therefore, more likely to reach a
consensus.
195. See Landes & Posner, supra note 188.
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extent that the future application of the provision is clear, and the
position of the proponents static, this analysis seems persuasive.
In cases where the groups subject to the limitation might change
over time, however, such statutes may be less likely to promote narrow, interest group rent-seeking, and more likely to further general
agreement and redistribution, since the group can no longer be assured
that it will be in a position to benefit from the statute. 196 The clearest
examples, as outlined below, are statutes limiting executive powers
where party control of the executive branch is expected to change over
time, or broad, all-encompassing tax statutes. In such cases, in periods
of rapid turnover and long-term application, there may be some
greater likelihood of reaching a consensus and less likelihood that actors will pursue their narrow marginal advantage at the cost of a
broader societal benefit.197
C. Separation-of-Powers Problems: A Case Study in the Value of
the Veil and Political Parties
While a veil can be generally useful in these various ways, it is
important to appreciate that a properly functioning two-party system
can also be quite successful in establishing its own type of macro-political veil of ignorance. As noted above, delegation to administrative
agencies may create a veil through different techniques of constitutional and statutory decisionmaking, helping sometimes to forge a
political consensus and overcoming the advantages of special int(;'.rest
groups. A briefreview of the history of separation-of-powers confrontations suggests that political parties have been important in this process. Conversely, their breakdown has had a negative impact on those
relations. The consensus and breakdown can be seen in two different
contexts- (1) control of the presidency and Congress, and (2) control
of executive agencies.
"
1.

Control of the Presidency and Congress

For much of the past one hundred years, the American political
system has been heavily influenced by two political parties that each
had the potential over time to capture any or all of the political
branches. 198 When one party was dominant for a brief period, moreover, it was usually able to control all branches of government. In
196. See supra note 173 (discussion of constitutional change in self-interest).
197. See infra section IV.C.l.
198. The following discussion draws heavily upon B. Ginsburg & M. Shefter, Political Parties, Electoral Conflict, and Institutional Combat (unpublished manuscript on file with the author). See also B. GINSBURG & M. SHEFfER, supra note 133.
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such an environment, individual politicians and political parties did
not ordinarily envision their interests as necessarily connected or
linked to the power of any one institution. While there clearly were
constitutional crises between branches during this period, it was not
demonstrably in the interest of a particular party or politician to concentrate power in any one institution - especially in a constitutional
sense - since the party might later be excluded from this power
center. In effect, a veil of ignorance existed in both statutory and constitutional debates regarding the likely beneficiary of institutional powers. As compared to today, there also was generally more agreement
over the extent of constitutional authority vested in executive and legislative officials.
In recent years, especially since 1968, however, this fluidity has
changed. Because of the decline of political parties and a variety of
other historical reasons, no party has recently been able to dominate
both branches simultaneously. To the extent there has been influence,
moreover, the Democratic party has had greater control of the legislative branch during this period, and the Republican party has more
often controlled the presidency. 199 Indeed, given the incumbency advantage in Congress, and the Republicans' recent advantage in presidential elections, most current political actors seem to expect that the
pattern will continue. One result of this situation is that the parties
and individual politicians now tend to envision their political interests
as tied to the particular institution that they inhabit and to the enhancement of the statutory and constitutional powers of that institution. 200 No longer need Democrats fear that reduced presidential
powers will block a modem Franklin Roosevelt; or Republicans fear
that enhanced executive powers will serve as the engine for a new New
Deal revolution~ This has been accompanied, not surprisingly, by a
resurgence in separation-of-powers confrontations between the president and the legislative branch. These include battles over legislative
199. See Ferejohn & Fiorina, Incumbency and Realignment in Congressional Elections, in
THE NEW DIRECTION lN AMERICAN POLlTICS 115 (J. Chubb & P. Peterson ed. 1985) (noting
the decreased association between presidential and congressional voting and the electorate's
seeming preference for a Republican in the White House); Fiorina, supra note 85 (documenting
the history of divided government and its possible explanations); Clymer, Political Terrain Seen
as Changing, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1989, at 27, col. 1 (discussing reasons for increasing Republican control of the presidency and Democratic control of the Congress). While many have speculated on the reasons for our present divided government, there is probably no generally accepted
explanation.
200. This appears to be a result of the institutionally specific control of parties as well as the
general breakdown of parties. For, with the general breakdown of parties and the rising independence of politicians, even if formal political control of the branches did change, it is uncertain
whether individual politicians would see their interests as tied to other branches that they individually would be unlikely to control.
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vetoes, 201 legislative oversight, executive privilege, 202 executive foreign
policy independence,203 and judicial and executive nominations. 204 In
the aggregate, these seem unusual in our political history. 205
While there probably are a variety of social and economic reasons
for this resurgence, one additional explanation is that the veil of ignorance over the institutional position of political interests and actors
has been lowered. Constitutional and statutory debates over institutional powers no longer occur behind a veil that protects the identity
of the political participants. For the foreseeable future, it seems likely
that strong legislative influence will be tied to the interests of the Democratic Party and strong presidential power to the Republican Party.
The loss in fluidity - the lowering of the veil - has undermined
political agreements over the constitutional and statutory powers of
the separate branches.206
201. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 969-74 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (outlining the
consensus that used to exist between Congress and the executive over the necessity and propriety
of the legislative veto); B. CRAIG, CHADHA.: THE STORY OF AN EPIC CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE 36, 106-07, 160 (1988) (discussing acquiescence of the executive branch to the legislative
veto prior to the explosion of its use in the 1970s, and the Justice Department's opposition to the
legislative veto under the Carter and Reagan administrations); Breyer, The Legislative Veto After
Chadha, 72 GEO. L.J. 785, 787 (1984) (suggesting that the legislative veto acted as a compromise
on many separation-of-powers issues). For a detailed account of the history of the legislative
veto, including the consensus on its use in the 1930s, see generally B. CRAIG, THE LEGISLATIVE
VETO: CoNGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF REGULATION 15-43 (1983).
202. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699-701 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (detailing
recent confrontation over executive privilege); Olson, The Impetuous Vortex: Congressional Erosion of Presidential Authority, in THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY: LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH 231-42 (L. Crovitz & J. Rabkin eds. 1989) [hereinafter THE FETTERED
PRESIDENCY] (cataloguing congressionat "encroachments" on supposedly traditional executive
powers).
203. See generally Koh, Why The President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons
of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1259-73 (1988) (faulting the special congressional
committee established to investigate the Iran-Contra scandal for not trying to understand the
incident as part of the post-Vietnam breakdown of the consensus between the executive and
Congress on foreign affairs).
204. See Totenberg, The Confirmation Process And The Public: To Know or Not to Know,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1213 (1988) (contrasting the confrontation over the Bork nomination with
the previous confirmation process for Supreme Court Justices); Chopping Down the President,
Wall St. J., Feb. 27, 1989, at AlO, col. 1 (suggesting a breakdown of bipartisanship on executive
appointments concerning foreign affairs).
205. See generally B. Ginsburg & M. Shefter, supra note 198; Monaghan, The Confirmation
Process! Law or Politics, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1202 (1988); Totenberg, supra note 204; Chopping
Down the President, supra note 204, at AlO, col. 1 (discussing Tower nomination). For this
reason, claims that institutional arguments need not be influenced by predictions of political
effect can be hazardous. See Sunstein, supra note 50, at 462-63 ("[T)here is no necessary connection between antiregulatory politics and executive control. In a different administration, executive centralization might have the opposite result."). Obviously, this can be a common problem
in debates over institutional choice. See Hirshman, Postmodern Jurisprudence and the Problem
ofAdministrative Discretion, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 646, 665-66 n.134 (1988) (discussing charges of
political bias in other institutional competence debates).
206. To public choice theorists, this breakdown of cooperation is familiar: it is analogous to
the public choice problem of maintaining cooperative behavior once the point of the end of the
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Control of Government Bureaucracy

The second way in which the veil has been pierced can be seen in
the oversight by congressional committees of agency implementation
of statutes. As several political scientists have detailed, delegation
often imposes a veil of ignorance about congressional actions upon the
diffuse public, but less so upon specially interested groups. 207 In particular, according to this view, when the costs of programs are diffuse
and the benefits concentrated, delegation of authority to administrative agencies can serve as a mechanism through which committees in
Congress, and their associated constituencies and special interest
groups, can hide many of the costs from the diffuse public, while pursuing their interests in the program at the agency implementation
stage.2os
To support this observation, some scholars have shown the informal control individual committees of Congress often have over executive administration. Because these committees frequently favor the
interests of narrow interest groups, delegation has sometimes been
thought to erect a veil around the general public that nevertheless allows congressional committees and special interest groups greater ability to affect the ultimate outcome through informal oversight of the
agencies. 209 The veil of ignorance implicit in delegation can thus be
asymmetric, potentially exacerbating the informational advantages of
special interest groups.
To the extent that this process has occurred, our ability to reach
agreements on the appropriate internal structures of the executive
game is known, and is not distant. Tit-for-tat strategies are not successful once the end of the
game is imminent. See R. HARDIN, supra note 14, at 145-50. Similarly, here, knowledge that the
institutional position of political parties and members is relatively certain creates incentives for
politicians to defect from cooperative strategies, since the opportunity for retaliation is
minimized.
·
207. See, e.g., Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process, 39 Pus. CHOICE 33, 53-54 (1982); Fiorina, Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control and the Delegatio,n of Legislative Power, 2 J.L. & EcoN. 33, 49 (1986) [hereinafter Fiorinn,
Legislator Uncertainty]; Weingast, The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal Agent
Perspective, 44 Pub. Choice 147, 181-82 (1984); Weingast & Moran, The Myth of Runaway Bureaucracy- The Case ofthe FTC. REGULATION, May-June 1982, at 33, 37-38. But see Moe, An
Assessment of the Positive Theory of Congressional Dominance, 12 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 475 (1987)
(questioning the'Congressional dominance theory).
208. See sources cited in note 207. See also Bruff, supra note 28, at 230; B. GINSBURG & M.
SHEFrER, supra note 133, at 176-77. For an explanation of the establishment of agency procedures and information structures primarily in terms of furthering the interests of the different
groups lobbying for the original legislation, see McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, supra note 36. Of
course, congressional oversight was originally seen as, and in some respects still is, a check on
agency capture. See note 215. The evidence now is that it may facilitate some forms of capture,
though the extent of congressional influence is still the subject of intensive debate. See, e.g., Moe,
supra note 207.
209. See Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 30, at 7; Pierce, supra note 48, at 483.
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branch may also have been affected. As time has elapsed, and the informal control has become apparent to political actors, debates over
the statutory and constitutional powers of independent agencies and
the bureaucracy of executive departments may have been exacerbated
for the same reasons that led to the separation-of-powers confrontations described above. 210 With political control over both the presidency and Congress fairly clear, presidential authority over these
agencies means, as a practical matter, greater Republican control.
Agency autonomy, on the other hand, with congressional oversight,
often means greater Democratic control. Like constitutional and statutory debates on the separation of powers, divisions over the control
and structure of the executive branch are now clearer and more
politicized.211
In light of this history, it is apparent that ignorance has advantages
and that important political costs are created by the greater certainty
of political position. In the past, passage of long-term statutes or acceptance of informal agreements on executive and legislative powers
often created fewer divisions because there was the distinct possibility
of both executive and legislative turnover. With the decline of a competitive two-party system, this greater ability to reach political agreement over legitimate institutional powers has diminished. A veil that
would ideally help equalize political influence and facilitate political
agreements does not exist.
3.

Future Reforms

While there is no obvious solution to this complicated situation, it
is important to recognize that many past and proposed reforms in the
civic virtue tradition, whatever their other values, may exacerbate this
210. For a discussion of the constitutionality of independent agencies, see generally Synar v.
United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1398 (D.D.C. 1986) (asserting the difficulty of reconciling the
holding in Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), with separation of powers); Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. Cr. REV. 41, 96-97; Scalia, Historical Anomalies in
Administrative Law, 1985 SUP. Cr. HIST. SocY. 103, 106-10. The debate over executive department autonomy has occurred with respect to the regulatory orders in the Reagan administration.
See Exec. Ord. 12291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982); and Executive
Order 12498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
For commentary on the degree to which the White House exercises or should exercise power
over rulemaking by the Office of Management and Budget, see, for example, DeMuth & Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1986); Morrison,
OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 1059 (1986).
211. In light of this analysis, the value of high level government commissions as a decisionmaking device can be appreciated. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text. While delegation of decisionmaking to the president or an administrative agency can be suspect for the
reasons outlined above, a commission can be made balanced in its membership. In effect, by
combining the membership of the separate branches, it can recreate the veil of institutional
position.
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effect. 212 As discussed above, civic virtue theory favors stimulating a
rich and diverse dialogue about administrative issues through "proliferating points of access" to administrative decisionmaking. Courts,
the president, Congress, and perhaps the public generally are all supposed to become more involved in administrative decisions. 213 Promoting mechanisms that facilitate legislative, presidential, and judicial
participation should not only stimulate dialogue, but should also reduce the comparative advantage of special interest groups through a
type of competitive oversight. 214
While there is much to be said on behalf of these changes, 215 especially given the necessity for broad delegations of authority today, as a
totality they can further exacerbate the breakdown of the veil, as issues
are increasingly fought out within the executive branch on a case-bycase basis, ex post. Instead of debates on institutional powers being
made behind a "veil," real decisionmaking for the most part is delayed
and transformed into a bargaining process within the executive branch
on an issue-by-issue basis. Moreover, in recent years, these debates
have probably become increasingly protracted due to the greater political independence and security of political actors, especially members
of Congress21 6 - an independance that civic virtue theory would seem
to applaud as the structural precondition to a diverse and rich public
212. One solution, put forward by some scholars, is to abandon the veil altogether. See
Aranson, Gellhom & Robinson, supra note 30; see also T. Low1, supra note 35. According to
this analysis, courts should reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine and produce greater specific·
ity in statutes. Obviously this would avoid some of the perverse effects of legislation oversight,
but might throw the baby out with the bath water. See Mashaw, supra note 48.
213. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. In order to ensure this dialogue, oversight from all of these institutions is supposed to be enhanced, with information about executive
agencies disclosed through the Freedom of Information Act, the government in the Sunshine
Act, legislative oversight, and enhanced judicial review under the hard-look doctrine.
214. These proposals are based in part on the old New Deal model of special interest group
influence, where power was supposed to have been exercised behind closed doors between bu·
reaucrats and interest group representatives. See Sunstein, supra note 50, at 450 ("Agency au·
tonomy, in short, has often served not as a guarantor of neutral administration, but as a source of
vulnerability to the pressure of well-organized groups.").
215. See Bruff, supra note 28, at 210, 248 (concluding that the approach "acknowledge(s]
political influence and concentrate[s] on ensuring that it [is] openly and fairly exercised"; "[t]he
widespread access to policymaking processes that the agencies are required to provide fosters
compromise, ... ensuring that public policy will be supported by coalitions representing a set of
values that is relatively widely accepted"); Fiorina, Legislator Uncertainty, supra note 207, at 49
(increasing proceduralization of administrative agencies after late 1960s consistent with "legislators trying to counter increasingly evident biases in the administrative processes"); cf. Mccubbins & Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 2 AM.
J. POL. Sci. 165 (1984) (discussing information proliferation as helping to solve principal/agency
problems of Congress); McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, supra note 36 (same).
216. There is a now voluminous literature on the congressional incumbency effect - espe·
cially in the House of Representatives. See, e.g., Ferejohn & Fiorina, supra note 199, at 91-117;
Fiorina, supra note 141, at 37-39.
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dialogue. 217 In this environment, however, independence and the certainty of position may undermine the ability to reach agreements on
institutional powers. In short, efforts to stimulate dialogue and "viture" under a civic virtue philosophy may be in tension with a "veil of
ignorance" approach.
At the same time, there is also some question about the extent to
which the civic virtue proposals will actually minimize the influence of
special interest groups. The theory behind this view is that the increased spotlight of competitive checking and participation after delegation will minimize the back-door, behind-the-scenes "deals" that
inspired the common criticisms of the traditional New Deal agency. 218
In many cases this is undoubtedly true, as administrative decisionmakers respond over the short run to potential exposure. 219 Overall, however, the increased complexity of the process can, for the
reasons discussed above in Part III, have another effect on the public
at large, especially on an electoral level: advantaging specialized constituencies that have a greater ability to untangle the complexity of
administrative dialogue and inputs, while disadvantaging the diffuse
public, which does not know whom to hold accountable, especially in
its electoral judgments. 220 The ultimate effect on systemic political accountability can be quite complicated.
The traditional political party model, on the other hand, would
offer a quite different perspective on these problems. It would likely
seek to deemphasize informational access to the initial formulation
and implementatiqn of executive programs in particular cases by erecting more informational barriers to executive agencies. As one scholar
discussing this policy has observed, increases in congressional oversight can "inhibit[ ] democratic control of policy and administration of
an idealized sort - coherent, coordinated programmatic in the responsible parties sense."221 The "very system feature (disciplined,
217. See Sunstein, supra note 87, at 31-38; Farber & Frickey, supra note 87, at 912 n.224;
Tushnet, Schneider & Kovner, Judicial Review and Congressional Tenure: An Observation, 66
TEXAS L. REV. 967 (1988).
218. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
220. See W. BURNHAM, Shifting Patterns of Congressional Voting Participation 1981, in THE
CURRENT CRISIS IN AMERICAN PoLmCS 196 (1982) (observing that the mass electorate is "baffled by the complexity of our constitutional arrangements, has extremely low levels of information, and has not been educated by any social instrumentality . . . to an understanding of
politics") (emphasis omitted}; cf Bruff, supra note 28, at 247 (noting that with the increase in
inputs to the administrative process, "[t)he very multiplicity of competing actors suggests that no
one of them will attain effective control .... Consequently, an administrator usually has discretion in shaping policy.").
221. J. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT 212 (1990).
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centralized decisionmaking) that seems to enhance the accountability
of decisionmakers to the public may [be consistent with a] restrict[ed]
role of legislative bodies in oversight."222 Thus, this approach might
well be more sympathetic toward increased presidential power over
certain . nationwide agency operations, while legislative oversight
would be more limited at the initial stages. A variety of reforms such
as some limitations on legislative oversight, 223 simultaneous transmission of agency budgets and other information to Congress, 224 and
greater review by the Office of Management and Budget of major
agency action and legislation, falls into this category. 225 While there
are constitutional impediments to a full implementation of any party
approach, which in its extreme form runs contrary to checks and balances, the goal would be to make the president more responsible for
and accountable to the public for agency decisions.
Unfortunately, this approach can succeed, even on a modest basis,
only if we have an accountable president and truly strong, competitive
parties to recreate the veil. 226 To the extent that we continue to have
weak parties, each controlling a separate branch of government, centralized executive authority creates legitimate concerns of tyranny,
one-party control of .executive decisions, and substantially reduced
public dialogue and public participation.
Given this potential tension between legal participation and political accountability, we need to recognize that there are costs to a sin222. Id. at 211. In short, "the more centralized and coordinated that authority in government becomes, the less likely it is that the legislative body will be an active overseer of policy and
administration." Id. at 209; see also Bruff, supra note 28, at 233 ("the President lacks strong
incentives to intervene in regulation because he bears only attenuated political responsibility for
decisions made in the agencies"). As Donald Horowitz has observed of the presidency:
Cautioning against a plural executive, Hamilton, in The Federalist, warned that a proliferation of personnel would make personal accountability for executive misdeeds difficult to
establish. It would deprive the public of the "opportunity of discovering with facility and
clearness the misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to [achieve] their removal
from office, or [] their actual punishment in cases which admit of it." In public psychology
and in legal conception, we have the unitary executive of the Framers; in the difficulty of
tracing responsibility and in the accompanying immobilism, we have something closer to the
plural executive they rejected.
Horowitz, Is the Presidency Failing?, 88 Pua. INT. 3, 20 (1987).
223. See generally THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY, supra note 202.
224. See, e.g., 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 632 (1982).
225. See supra note 210. As Aberbach has noted, "the vecy discipline and electoral accountability of a democratic system with effectively centralized and coordinated authority over policy
and administration is more than compatible with a restricted legislative role in oversight." J,
ABERBACH, supra note 221, at 210; see also Bruff, supra note 28, at 233 ("centralized review of
regulations can help the President check policy that may result from agency alliances with congressional committees or interest groups, enhancing his power against those forces"); Weingast,

Regulation, Reregulation, and Deregulation: The Political Foundations ofAgency Clientele Relationships, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1981, at 147, 159.
226. As discussed above, we do not at the moment. See supra section III.D.
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gular pursuit of the civic virtue approach. Many past and future
reforms in administrative law, whatever their other benefits, may also
undermine our ability to reach agreements on government powers and
may have a mixed value for diffuse constituencies. In this situation,
attempts to limit disclosure in some narrow areas, such as the formulation of the executive branch regulatory agenda, coupled with enhanced
presidential oversight, may serve to further political accountability.227
At the same time, these changes would need to be accompanied by
stronger, more competitive political parties, as outlined in Part III, to
ensure that the veil implicit in legislative delegation would be maintained and that centralized control would not lead to an institutional
advantage for one political ideology.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this article, which some might view as an exercise
in intellectual arbitrage between law and political science, has been to
explore the paradox implicit in some traditional writings on political
parties: that political institutions have in some areas performed better
with less information. This anomaly should be especially significant to
legal scholars, since two prominent legal intellectual models - civic
virtue and law and economics - often view greater information and
political communications as the solution to current problems. These
benefits include stimulating greater normative evaluation of public
decisionmaking as well as promoting more responsible and efficient
government.
As this article has suggested, however, less information and reduced communications have been beneficial in some contexts, both
normatively and instrumentally. In the past, the shaping and narrowing of political information through the organization of political parties and party identification has in some respects improved the ability
of the public to understand, make sense of, and ·control political
events. The accountability of individual political representatives to
group activities through party identification has also limited the influence of interest groups. With the breakdown of parties and party identification, on the other hand, the entrepreneurial ability of independent
political actors to gain support in their districts has been one of the
causes of political universalism, affecting the allocation of social
resources.
In addition, as a normative matter, vagueness in legislative delegation has sometimes improved deliberative processes and furthered
227. See Strauss, supra note 48, at 666.
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political consensus by limiting the ability of political actors to calculate the specific costs and benefits of government policy on their own
interest. Indeed, in some cases, delaying the discussion of problems, in
the spirit of nonideological parties, has facilitated agreement, especially in the budget and party context, thereby improving government's ability to act. In short, contrary to the usual presumption, less
information can improve normative as well as instrumental objectives
in some arenas, and thus should be considered as part of general policy
analysis.
Despite this benefit, the resolution of current policy issues is surely
not to adopt general or even major restrictions on information. As
law-and-economics and civic virtue scholars have persuasively demonstrated, information is an important resource for social progress. 228
Rather, I have speculated on how some institutions might be restructured to shape the dissemination of information, consistent with the
insights of the political party perspective. These changes, which highlight the trade-offs raised by many current public law strategies, would
seek to improve the informational capacities of centralized institutions
such as parties, while implicitly diminishing those of individual political actors. The purpose is to further governmental and social consensus, innovation, and responsibility, broadly conceived.

228. Moreover, the fact that less information may have been beneficial does not suggest we
should risk affirmatively empowering government officials to impose restrictions.

